Third-party punishment games enable empirical study of social norms.

Evidence

Thus, our results show that the notion of strong reciprocity extends to the sanctioning behavior of ”unaffected” third parties. In addition, these experiments suggest that thirdparty punishment games are powerful tools for studying the characteristics and the content of social norms. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2

Categorization

• SEED: An angle: using Fehr & Fischbacher’s framing, could write about how ‘image scoring’ literalism fails when the stigma is permanently worn — the A stays after the offense is paid for.
• XREF: connects to: Costly norm enforcement by unaffected bystanders reveals strong reciprocity. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2; Third-party punishment renders defection in a one-shot dyadic exchange unprofitable. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 117; Social control includes winning consent, not just coercive punishment (+4 more)

Related

• Multiple third-party punishers can make norm violations unprofitable, acting as strong norm enforcers. (similarity 0.88)
• Costly norm enforcement by unaffected bystanders reveals strong reciprocity. (similarity 0.88)
• An impartial third party who punishes at personal cost demonstrates strong reciprocity. (similarity 0.87)
• Researchers distinguish punishment by a harmed party from punishment by an unaffected third party. (similarity 0.86)
• Different social-preference models make distinguishable predictions about who punishes. (similarity 0.85)
• Even unaffected bystanders punish norm violations at personal cost. (similarity 0.84)
• Second-party sanctions are contaminated by self-interest; third-party sanctions reveal true norms. (similarity 0.84)
• Third-party punishment renders defection in a one-shot dyadic exchange unprofitable. (similarity 0.83)
• Impartial third parties punish norm violators at personal cost. (similarity 0.82)
• Ernst Fehr — Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms (similarity 0.82)
• Directly harmed victims punish more strongly than unaffected third parties. (similarity 0.81)
• Third parties punish inequality even when it does not directly involve them. (similarity 0.81)
• People punish norm violations at personal cost even without direct harm (similarity 0.81)
• Social norm enforcement may be a defining trait of humanity. (similarity 0.80)
• A punisher’s own gains do not reduce punishment of unrelated violators. (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Third-party punishment renders defection in a one-shot dyadic exchange unprofitable. #exemplifies (0.92) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 117
• Social control includes winning consent, not just coercive punishment #qualifies (0.78)