Deterrent threats can be passive but compellent threats require commitment

Evidence

There is typically a difference between a threat intended to make an adversary do something (or cease doing something) and a threat intended to keep him from starting something. The distinction is in the timing, in who has to make the first move, in whose initiative is put to the test. To deter by threat an enemy’s advance it may be enough to burn the bridges behind me as I face the enemy; to compel by threat an enemy’s retreat I have to be committed to move forward, and this requires setting fire to the grass behind me with the wind blowing toward the enemy. I can block your car in the road by placing my car in your way; my deterrent threat is passive, the decision to collide is up to you. If you, however, find me in your way and threaten to collide unless I move, you enjoy no such advantage; the decision to collide is still yours, and I enjoy deterrence. You have to arrange to have to collide unless I move, and that is a degree more complicated. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 438

Categorization

• DEFINE: Distinguishes deterrent from compellent threats by who must make the first move and whose initiative is at stake.
• XREF: Maps directly onto the reader’s stated Gambetta/Milgrom framework: the Mafia’s deterrence operates passively while compellence (extortion, tribute demands) needs the commitment devices Schelling analyzes. — connects to: A deterrent threat is only credible if control over its triggering is partly surrendered. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 429; Irreversible commitments force the enemy, not oneself, to be the one who yields. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 433; A threat must be credible and credible threats require commitment — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 23 (+6 more)

Related

• A threat to act is only credible if one is committed, not merely willing (similarity 0.85)
• A threat only coerces when the threatener has visibly left himself no choice (similarity 0.85)
• Credible threats can be conveyed by action rather than verbal pledge (similarity 0.84)
• A deterrent threat is only credible if control over its triggering is partly surrendered. (similarity 0.84)
• A credible threat works precisely because it need never be carried out. (similarity 0.84)
• A threat must be credible and credible threats require commitment (similarity 0.84)
• Irreversible commitments force the enemy, not oneself, to be the one who yields. (similarity 0.83)
• Credible threats can require revealing information that defeats the threat (similarity 0.83)
• Credible threats must attach penalties to observable acts, not intentions (similarity 0.82)
• Commitment buys first move while threat commits to a second-move response strategy (similarity 0.82)
• Protection demands are credible only when they come from established sources. (similarity 0.82)
• Deterrence rests on surviving retaliation capacity, not on existing destructive capacity. (similarity 0.82)
• Threats require commitment, not comparative damage to both parties (similarity 0.81)
• Commitment strategies require communication and risk provoking stalemate (similarity 0.81)
• Credible commitment requires finding a penalty against one’s own nonperformance (similarity 0.81)

Broader Connections

• A threat must be credible and credible threats require commitment #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 23
• Commitment strategies require communication and risk provoking stalemate #expands (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 77
• A deterrence threat often hurts the threatener as much as the threatened #qualifies (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 32
• Credible threats can be conveyed by action rather than verbal pledge #qualifies (0.72) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 34