Threats, promises, and commitments unify as payoff-restricting reaction functions

Evidence

Threats, promises, and unconditional commitments have already been illustrated; a more general “reaction function” is illustrated in the accompanying matrix. If Row can attach adequate penalties to his own selection of any cells other than those starred, he leaves Column a simple maximization problem which Column solves by choosing his third strategy. Row has “won” almost his favorite cell; specifically, he has secured for himself the most favorable cell among those that leave Column no lower than his “minimax” value. This is the generalization of the tactic that, for simple two-way or three-way choices, can be identified as a “commitment,” “threat,” “promise,” or combination of them. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 783

Categorization

• DEFINE: Formalizes the unifying concept behind threat/promise/commitment as a selective reduction of one’s own payoffs.
• XREF: connects to: A fractional commitment blends a threat with a promise — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 411; Warnings differ from threats because warnings convey true incentives without commitment — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 763; Commitment buys first move while threat commits to a second-move response strategy — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 294 (+3 more)

Related

• Commitments, promises, and threats all reduce a player’s own payoffs visibly and irreversibly (similarity 0.86)
• Commitment buys first move while threat commits to a second-move response strategy (similarity 0.82)
• Threats only matter when players can irreversibly change the game (similarity 0.82)
• Committing to a strategy can yield a better outcome than remaining uncommitted (similarity 0.81)
• A credible conditional commitment must combine both a promise and a threat. (similarity 0.80)
• A fractional commitment blends a threat with a promise (similarity 0.80)
• One player’s promise can worsen the other player’s position (similarity 0.80)
• Irreversible commitments force the enemy, not oneself, to be the one who yields. (similarity 0.80)
• Even a player sure of his own restraint inherits the other’s amplified fears (similarity 0.79)
• A threat only coerces when the threatener has visibly left himself no choice (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Commitment buys first move while threat commits to a second-move response strategy #expands (0.82) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 294
• Deterrent threats can be passive but compellent threats require commitment #qualifies (0.78) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 438