Protection demands are credible only when they come from established sources.

Evidence

As a rule, one must threaten that he will act, not that he may act, if the threat fails. To say that one may act is to say that one may not, and to say this is to confess that one has kept the power of decision—that one is not committed. To say only that one may carry out the threat, not that one certainly will, is to invite the opponent to guess whether one will prefer to punish himself and his opponent or to pass up the occasion. Furthermore, if one says that he may—not that he will—and the opponent fails to heed the threat, and the threatener chooses not to carry it out, he only confirms his opponent’s belief that when he has a clear choice to act or to abstain he will choose to abstain — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 414 (#expands, via linked claim)

We have learned that a threat has to be credible to be efficacious, and that its credibility may depend on the costs and risks associated with fulfillment for the party making the threat. We have developed the idea of making a threat credible by getting ourselves committed to its fulfillment, through the stretching of a “trip wire” across the enemy’s path of advance, or by making fulfillment a matter of national honor and prestige—as in the case, say, of the Formosa Resolution. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 23 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: A threat to act is only credible if one is committed, not merely willing — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 414; A deterrent threat is only too large when its size damages credibility — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 711; Credible commitment requires proof beyond mere assertion of intent. (+1 more)

Related

• A threat to act is only credible if one is committed, not merely willing (similarity 0.91)
• A threat must be credible and credible threats require commitment (similarity 0.91)
• A credible threat works precisely because it need never be carried out. (similarity 0.87)
• A credible threat can subordinate the final decision to chance outside the threatener’s control (similarity 0.83)
• Credible threats must attach penalties to observable acts, not intentions (similarity 0.82)
• A deterrent threat is only credible if control over its triggering is partly surrendered. (similarity 0.82)
• Credible threats can be conveyed by action rather than verbal pledge (similarity 0.82)
• Deterrent threats can be passive but compellent threats require commitment (similarity 0.82)
• A credible conditional commitment must combine both a promise and a threat. (similarity 0.81)
• Credible threats can require revealing information that defeats the threat (similarity 0.81)
• Small-probability threats are superior to large certain threats in compellence (similarity 0.80)
• Credible commitment requires finding a penalty against one’s own nonperformance (similarity 0.80)
• Commitments must be communicated through evidence, not just words. (similarity 0.80)
• A threat only coerces when the threatener has visibly left himself no choice (similarity 0.80)
• Threats gain credibility by decomposing into a series of smaller demonstrated steps (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• A threat to act is only credible if one is committed, not merely willing #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 414
• A threat must be credible and credible threats require commitment #corroborates (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 23
• Credible commitment requires proof beyond mere assertion of intent. #expands (0.75)
• A deterrent threat is only too large when its size damages credibility #qualifies (0.70) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 711