Threats only matter when players can irreversibly change the game

Evidence

The issue here is in whether or not we admit that the game has “moves,” that is, that it is possible for one player or both players to take actions in the course of the game that irreversibly change the game itself—that in some fashion alter the payoff matrix, the order of choices, or the information structure of the game. If the game by its definition admits no moves of any sort, except mutual agreement and refusal to agree, then it may be true that the “personalities” of the players determine the outcome, in the sense that their expectations in a “moveless” game converge by a process that is wholly psychic. But, if a threat is anything more than an assertion that is intended to appeal to the other player by power of suggestion, we must ask what more it can be. And it must involve some notion of commitment—real or fake—if it is to be anything. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 299

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines the technical sense of ‘moves’ that makes commitment-based threats coherent.
• XREF: connects to: Strategic wins always operate through constraining the opponent’s choice. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 637; One player’s promise can worsen the other player’s position — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 787; Linking two separate negotiations can enable threats impossible within a single game. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 128 (+2 more)

Related

• Commitments, promises, and threats all reduce a player’s own payoffs visibly and irreversibly (similarity 0.86)
• One player’s promise can worsen the other player’s position (similarity 0.86)
• Commitment buys first move while threat commits to a second-move response strategy (similarity 0.85)
• Linking two separate negotiations can enable threats impossible within a single game. (similarity 0.83)
• A threat only coerces when the threatener has visibly left himself no choice (similarity 0.83)
• A credible conditional commitment must combine both a promise and a threat. (similarity 0.83)
• Threats, promises, and commitments unify as payoff-restricting reaction functions (similarity 0.82)
• Deterrent threats can be passive but compellent threats require commitment (similarity 0.81)
• Strategic moves work by constraining one’s own behavior to shape an opponent’s expectations. (similarity 0.81)
• Threats require commitment, not comparative damage to both parties (similarity 0.81)
• Even a player sure of his own restraint inherits the other’s amplified fears (similarity 0.80)
• A threat to act is only credible if one is committed, not merely willing (similarity 0.79)
• Credible commitment requires finding a penalty against one’s own nonperformance (similarity 0.79)
• Non-symmetric moves like commitments and threats enrich cooperative games. (similarity 0.79)
• Irreversible commitments force the enemy, not oneself, to be the one who yields. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Commitments, promises, and threats all reduce a player’s own payoffs visibly and irreversibly #qualifies (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 347