A threat to act is only credible if one is committed, not merely willing

Evidence

As a rule, one must threaten that he will act, not that he may act, if the threat fails. To say that one may act is to say that one may not, and to say this is to confess that one has kept the power of decision—that one is not committed. To say only that one may carry out the threat, not that one certainly will, is to invite the opponent to guess whether one will prefer to punish himself and his opponent or to pass up the occasion. Furthermore, if one says that he may—not that he will—and the opponent fails to heed the threat, and the threatener chooses not to carry it out, he only confirms his opponent’s belief that when he has a clear choice to act or to abstain he will choose to abstain — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 414

Categorization

• DEFINE: Establishes the core distinction between a firm commitment threat and a noncommittal ‘may act’ statement — the grammar of credible commitment that the whole chapter builds on.
• XREF: Connects directly to Milgrom, North, and Weingast’s private judges analysis and Gambetta’s Sicilian Mafia protection market: the Don’s threat is only binding if he surrenders the power of decision. — connects to: Protection demands are credible only when they come from established sources.; Violence is rare but must remain a credible perpetual threat for mafiosi; Credible threats can be conveyed by action rather than verbal pledge — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 34 (+15 more)

Related

• Protection demands are credible only when they come from established sources. (similarity 0.91)
• A credible threat works precisely because it need never be carried out. (similarity 0.88)
• A threat must be credible and credible threats require commitment (similarity 0.88)
• A credible threat can subordinate the final decision to chance outside the threatener’s control (similarity 0.87)
• Credible threats must attach penalties to observable acts, not intentions (similarity 0.86)
• A credible conditional commitment must combine both a promise and a threat. (similarity 0.86)
• A threat only coerces when the threatener has visibly left himself no choice (similarity 0.85)
• Deterrent threats can be passive but compellent threats require commitment (similarity 0.85)
• Credible threats can be conveyed by action rather than verbal pledge (similarity 0.84)
• Commitments must be communicated through evidence, not just words. (similarity 0.83)
• Credible commitment requires finding a penalty against one’s own nonperformance (similarity 0.82)
• Credible threats can require revealing information that defeats the threat (similarity 0.82)
• Threats require commitment, not comparative damage to both parties (similarity 0.81)
• A deterrent threat is only credible if control over its triggering is partly surrendered. (similarity 0.81)
• Threats only matter when players can irreversibly change the game (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• A threat must be credible and credible threats require commitment #corroborates (0.95) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 23
• Credible commitment requires proof beyond mere assertion of intent. #corroborates (0.90)
• Credible threats must attach penalties to observable acts, not intentions #expands (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 106
• Threats require commitment, not comparative damage to both parties #expands (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 296
• A fulfilled threat gains credibility from its value to future threats, not present gain #qualifies (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 83
• A deterrent threat is only credible if control over its triggering is partly surrendered. #corroborates (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 429
• Credible threats can be conveyed by action rather than verbal pledge #expands (0.72) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 34