Commitment buys first move while threat commits to a second-move response strategy

Evidence

The threat differs from the ordinary commitment, however, in that it makes one’s course of action conditional on what the other player does. While the commitment fixes one’s course of action, the threat fixes a course of reaction, of response to the other player. The commitment is a means of gaining first move in a game in which first move carries an advantage; the threat is a commitment to a strategy for second move. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 294

Categorization

• DEFINE: Central distinction between commitment and threat as distinct strategic moves — conditional reaction vs. fixed course.
• XREF: connects to: Threats, promises, and commitments unify as payoff-restricting reaction functions — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 783; Commitment strategies require communication and risk provoking stalemate — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 77; Moves reveal value systems and commit players where speech cannot — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 240 (+5 more)

Related

• Threats only matter when players can irreversibly change the game (similarity 0.85)
• A credible conditional commitment must combine both a promise and a threat. (similarity 0.84)
• Threats, promises, and commitments unify as payoff-restricting reaction functions (similarity 0.82)
• Committing to a strategy can yield a better outcome than remaining uncommitted (similarity 0.82)
• A threat only coerces when the threatener has visibly left himself no choice (similarity 0.82)
• Commitment strategies require communication and risk provoking stalemate (similarity 0.82)
• Deterrent threats can be passive but compellent threats require commitment (similarity 0.82)
• Strategic moves work by constraining one’s own behavior to shape an opponent’s expectations. (similarity 0.82)
• Moves reveal value systems and commit players where speech cannot (similarity 0.82)
• One player’s promise can worsen the other player’s position (similarity 0.81)
• Leaving a final standing offer is a winning commitment tactic. (similarity 0.80)
• Commitment converts an indeterminate bargaining situation into a determinate two-move game (similarity 0.80)
• Commitments, promises, and threats all reduce a player’s own payoffs visibly and irreversibly (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• First-mover advantage decides bargaining when commitments are costless and binding #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 69
• Commitment converts an indeterminate bargaining situation into a determinate two-move game #corroborates (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 289
• Committing to a strategy can yield a better outcome than remaining uncommitted #corroborates (0.78) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 353