A credible conditional commitment must combine both a promise and a threat.

Evidence

Figure 4 is the same as Fig. 3 except that αB has been moved leftward. Here, in the absence of communication, North wins at αβ regardless of whether he or East moves first or moves are simultaneous. If, however, East can communicate a conditional commitment, he can force North to choose A and an outcome of Aβ. But this commitment is something more than either a promise or a threat; it is both a promise and a threat. He must threaten αB if North chooses α; and he must promise “not AB” if North chooses A. The threat alone will not induce North to avoid α; αB is better than AB for North, and AB is what he gets with A if East is free to choose B. East must commit himself to do, for either α or A, the opposite of what he would do if he were not committed: abstention from AB or immolation at αB. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 126

Categorization

• DEFINE: Distinguishes the compound nature of a conditional commitment — it requires making oneself worse off than free choice under one branch while rewarding the counterparty under the other.
• XREF: connects to: A fractional commitment blends a threat with a promise — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 411; A conditional commitment fails if its conditions cannot be verified after the fact — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 717; A threat must be credible and credible threats require commitment — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 23 (+6 more)

Related

• A threat only coerces when the threatener has visibly left himself no choice (similarity 0.86)
• A threat to act is only credible if one is committed, not merely willing (similarity 0.86)
• A credible threat can subordinate the final decision to chance outside the threatener’s control (similarity 0.85)
• A threat must be credible and credible threats require commitment (similarity 0.85)
• A fractional commitment blends a threat with a promise (similarity 0.84)
• Commitment buys first move while threat commits to a second-move response strategy (similarity 0.84)
• Threats only matter when players can irreversibly change the game (similarity 0.83)
• A threat binds only if the other believes it cannot be retracted (similarity 0.82)
• Credible commitment requires finding a penalty against one’s own nonperformance (similarity 0.82)
• Protection demands are credible only when they come from established sources. (similarity 0.81)
• Deterrent threats can be passive but compellent threats require commitment (similarity 0.81)
• One player’s promise can worsen the other player’s position (similarity 0.81)
• Threats, promises, and commitments unify as payoff-restricting reaction functions (similarity 0.80)
• A credible threat works precisely because it need never be carried out. (similarity 0.80)
• A deterrent threat is only credible if control over its triggering is partly surrendered. (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Threats require commitment, not comparative damage to both parties #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 296
• A threat to act is only credible if one is committed, not merely willing #corroborates (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 414
• Threats, promises, and commitments unify as payoff-restricting reaction functions #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 783
• A fulfilled threat gains credibility from its value to future threats, not present gain #expands (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 83
• Credible threats can be conveyed by action rather than verbal pledge #expands (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 34
• A credible threat can subordinate the final decision to chance outside the threatener’s control #complicates (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 416