Mutual nuclear deterrence is a modern form of hostage exchange.

Evidence

The novelty of this reasoning disappears as soon as we recognize that the “balance of terror,” if it is stable, is simply a massive and modern version of an ancient institution: the exchange of hostages. In older times, one committed himself to a promise by delivering his hostages physically into the hands of his distrustful “partner”; today’s military technology makes it possible to have the lives of a potential enemy’s women and children within one’s grasp while he keeps those women and children thousands of miles away. As long as each side has the manifest power to destroy a nation and its population in response to an attack by the other, the “balance of terror” amounts to a tacit understanding backed by a total exchange of all conceivable hostages. We may not, of course, want to exchange quite that many hostages in support of this particular understanding with this particular enemy. But in a lawless world that provides no recourse to damage suits for breach of this unwritten contract, hostages may be the only device by which mutually distrustful and antagonistic partners can strike a bargain. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 545

Categorization

• XREF: Directly maps onto the reader’s Gambetta/Milgrom framing: nuclear hostages as Schellingian credible commitments — the same hostage mechanics the Mafia uses in lieu of state contract law. — connects to: Giving up defensive weapons is logically identical to exchanging hostages — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 315; Cheapening nuclear weapons is eroding the precondition for deterrence; Hostages and shared vulnerability render agreements self-enforcing — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 313 (+1 more)

Related

• Giving up defensive weapons is logically identical to exchanging hostages (similarity 0.89)
• Hostages and shared vulnerability render agreements self-enforcing (similarity 0.83)
• Deterrence requires mixed conflict and common interest between parties (similarity 0.81)
• Mutual deterrence depends on balance stability, not on sheer symmetry. (similarity 0.81)
• Deterrent threats can be passive but compellent threats require commitment (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Giving up defensive weapons is logically identical to exchanging hostages #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 315
• Hostages and shared vulnerability render agreements self-enforcing #expands (0.82) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 313
• Cheapening nuclear weapons is eroding the precondition for deterrence #qualifies (0.80)
• Deterrence requires mixed conflict and common interest between parties #expands (0.78) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 33