A threat must be credible and credible threats require commitment

Evidence

We have learned that a threat has to be credible to be efficacious, and that its credibility may depend on the costs and risks associated with fulfillment for the party making the threat. We have developed the idea of making a threat credible by getting ourselves committed to its fulfillment, through the stretching of a “trip wire” across the enemy’s path of advance, or by making fulfillment a matter of national honor and prestige—as in the case, say, of the Formosa Resolution. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 23

Categorization

• XREF: Directly parallel to the reader’s Schellingian reading of Godfather-bonds: Don Corleone’s promise of vengeance is credible because refusing to fulfill it would cost him his reputation/authority — the commitment mechanism that substitutes for state enforcement. — connects to: Protection demands are credible only when they come from established sources.; Violence is rare but must remain a credible perpetual threat for mafiosi; A threat to act is only credible if one is committed, not merely willing — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 414 (+11 more)

Related

• Protection demands are credible only when they come from established sources. (similarity 0.91)
• A threat to act is only credible if one is committed, not merely willing (similarity 0.88)
• Commitments must be communicated through evidence, not just words. (similarity 0.88)
• Credible threats can be conveyed by action rather than verbal pledge (similarity 0.86)
• Credible commitment requires finding a penalty against one’s own nonperformance (similarity 0.86)
• A credible threat works precisely because it need never be carried out. (similarity 0.85)
• A credible conditional commitment must combine both a promise and a threat. (similarity 0.85)
• Credible threats must attach penalties to observable acts, not intentions (similarity 0.85)
• A threat only coerces when the threatener has visibly left himself no choice (similarity 0.84)
• Deterrent threats can be passive but compellent threats require commitment (similarity 0.84)
• A credible threat can subordinate the final decision to chance outside the threatener’s control (similarity 0.83)
• A fulfilled threat gains credibility from its value to future threats, not present gain (similarity 0.83)
• Credible threats can require revealing information that defeats the threat (similarity 0.82)
• A deterrent threat is only credible if control over its triggering is partly surrendered. (similarity 0.82)
• Threats require commitment, not comparative damage to both parties (similarity 0.81)

Broader Connections

• Credible threats can be conveyed by action rather than verbal pledge #expands (0.90) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 34
• Threats require commitment, not comparative damage to both parties #corroborates (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 296
• Credible threats must attach penalties to observable acts, not intentions #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 106
• A credible conditional commitment must combine both a promise and a threat. #expands (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 126
• A fulfilled threat gains credibility from its value to future threats, not present gain #responds-to (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 83