A threat only coerces when the threatener has visibly left himself no choice

Evidence

The distinctive character of a threat is that one asserts that he will do, in a contingency, what he would manifestly prefer not to do if the contingency occurred, the contingency being governed by the second party’s behavior. Like the ordinary commitment, the threat is a surrender of choice, a renunciation of alternatives, that makes one worse off than he need be in the event the tactic fails; the threat and the commitment are both motivated by the possibility that a rational second player can be constrained by his knowledge that the first player has altered his own incentive structure. Like an ordinary commitment, a threat can constrain the other player only insofar as it carries to the other player at least some appearance of obligation; if I threaten to blow us both to bits unless you close the window, you know that I won’t unless I have somehow managed to leave myself no choice in the matter. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 293

Categorization

• DEFINE: Precise definitional distinction between a threat and an ordinary commitment: threat fixes a course of reaction to the other’s behavior, commitment fixes a first-move course.
• XREF: This is the constraint mechanism behind the Don’s Godfather-bonds — his reputation makes carrying out a threat obligatory-like, matching Milgrom’s private-judge enforcement logic. — connects to: A deterrent threat is only credible if control over its triggering is partly surrendered. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 429; A threat binds only if the other believes it cannot be retracted — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 297; A threat to act is only credible if one is committed, not merely willing — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 414 (+2 more)

Related

• A threat binds only if the other believes it cannot be retracted (similarity 0.89)
• A credible conditional commitment must combine both a promise and a threat. (similarity 0.86)
• A threat to act is only credible if one is committed, not merely willing (similarity 0.85)
• Credible commitment requires finding a penalty against one’s own nonperformance (similarity 0.85)
• Deterrent threats can be passive but compellent threats require commitment (similarity 0.85)
• A threat must be credible and credible threats require commitment (similarity 0.84)
• Irreversible commitments force the enemy, not oneself, to be the one who yields. (similarity 0.83)
• Threats only matter when players can irreversibly change the game (similarity 0.83)
• A credible threat works precisely because it need never be carried out. (similarity 0.83)
• A deterrent threat is only credible if control over its triggering is partly surrendered. (similarity 0.83)
• Failed threats create joint incentives to undo commitments that parties cannot jointly undo (similarity 0.83)
• Commitment buys first move while threat commits to a second-move response strategy (similarity 0.82)
• Credible threats can be conveyed by action rather than verbal pledge (similarity 0.82)
• A credible threat can subordinate the final decision to chance outside the threatener’s control (similarity 0.82)
• Threats require commitment, not comparative damage to both parties (similarity 0.82)

Broader Connections

• A threat binds only if the other believes it cannot be retracted #corroborates (0.98) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 297
• A threat to act is only credible if one is committed, not merely willing #corroborates (0.95) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 414
• A threat backed by reputation cannot be unilaterally renounced by its target #expands (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 720
• Credible threats can be conveyed by action rather than verbal pledge #expands (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 34