Mutual deterrence depends on balance stability, not on sheer symmetry.

Evidence

There is a difference between a balance of terror in which either side can obliterate the other and one in which both sides can do it no matter who strikes first. It is not the “balance”—the sheer equality or symmetry in the situation—that constitutes mutual deterrence; it is the stability of the balance. The balance is stable only when neither, in striking first, can destroy the other’s ability to strike back. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 529

Categorization

• XREF: Maps to Schellingian credible commitments in the reader’s framework — stability of the balance is the hostage-mechanic equilibrium. — connects to: Deterrence operates on graduated probability, not a binary trip-wire logic — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 460; Stability of mutual-deterrence equilibria depends on the slopes of each side’s response functions — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 502; Rational self-defense adjustments are compatible with both sides still preferring mutual non-attack — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 504 (+3 more)

Related

• Stability of mutual-deterrence equilibria depends on the slopes of each side’s response functions (similarity 0.88)
• A perfectly stable balance of deterrence may not even be desirable, let alone achievable. (similarity 0.86)
• Rational self-defense adjustments are compatible with both sides still preferring mutual non-attack (similarity 0.84)
• Deterrence rests on surviving retaliation capacity, not on existing destructive capacity. (similarity 0.84)
• Deterrence operates on graduated probability, not a binary trip-wire logic (similarity 0.83)
• Judging mutual invulnerability requires comparing two distinct deterrent threats (similarity 0.83)
• Known capability for failure can stabilize mutual-threat situations (similarity 0.82)
• Deterrence requires mixed conflict and common interest between parties (similarity 0.81)
• Mutual nuclear deterrence is a modern form of hostage exchange. (similarity 0.81)
• Deterrent threats can be passive but compellent threats require commitment (similarity 0.80)
• Mutually invulnerable retaliation forces neutralize each other’s deterrent role (similarity 0.80)
• Non-symmetry beats both committed symmetry and committed asymmetry. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• A perfectly stable balance of deterrence may not even be desirable, let alone achievable. #qualifies (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 581