Failed threats create joint incentives to undo commitments that parties cannot jointly undo

Evidence

In case a threat is made and fails to deter, there is a second stage prior to fulfillment in which both parties have an interest in undoing the commitment. The purpose of the threat is gone, its deterrence value is zero, and only the commitment exists to motivate fulfillment. … Furthermore, “undoing” does not mean neglecting a commitment regardless of reputation; “undoing,” if the commitment of reputation was real, means disconnecting the threat from one’s reputation, perhaps one’s own reputation with the threatened person himself. It is therefore a subtle and tenuous situation in which, though both have an interest in undoing the commitment, they may be quite unable to collaborate in undoing it. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 103

Categorization

• XREF: Expands the reader’s existing analysis of Godfather-bonds and hostage mechanics as Schellingian credible commitments — a failed threat here maps directly to the Mafioso’s dilemma of having made a promise he cannot keep. — connects to: Threats require commitment, not comparative damage to both parties — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 296; Law substitutes for trust where trustworthiness fails against endgame incentives; Groups induce cooperation through sanctions even without trusting their members — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 808 (+1 more)

Related

• A threat only coerces when the threatener has visibly left himself no choice (similarity 0.83)
• A threat backed by reputation cannot be unilaterally renounced by its target (similarity 0.81)
• Credible commitment requires finding a penalty against one’s own nonperformance (similarity 0.81)
• A threat must be credible and credible threats require commitment (similarity 0.81)
• Threats require commitment, not comparative damage to both parties (similarity 0.81)
• Irreversible commitments force the enemy, not oneself, to be the one who yields. (similarity 0.80)
• Deterrent threats can be passive but compellent threats require commitment (similarity 0.80)
• A fulfilled threat gains credibility from its value to future threats, not present gain (similarity 0.80)
• Agreements stay enforceable through the shadow of future bargains (similarity 0.80)
• A credible threat works precisely because it need never be carried out. (similarity 0.80)
• Hostages and shared vulnerability render agreements self-enforcing (similarity 0.79)
• Threats only matter when players can irreversibly change the game (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Threats require commitment, not comparative damage to both parties #qualifies (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 296
• Law substitutes for trust where trustworthiness fails against endgame incentives #expands (0.75)
• Groups induce cooperation through sanctions even without trusting their members #corroborates (0.75) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 808