Irreversible commitments force the enemy, not oneself, to be the one who yields.

Evidence

To share such an increase in risk with an enemy may provide him an overpowering incentive to lay off. Preferably one creates the shared risk by irreversible maneuvers or commitments, so that only the enemy’s withdrawal can tranquilize the situation; otherwise it may turn out to be a contest of nerves. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 433

Categorization

• XREF: The classic ‘burn the boats’ logic; maps onto hostage mechanics as credible commitment that the reader is tracking in The Godfather. — connects to: A threat to act is only credible if one is committed, not merely willing — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 414; Commitments are often manufactured by removing one’s own control over action — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 714; An enforceable promise requires destroying one’s own power not to comply — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 345 (+2 more)

Related

• Commitments are often manufactured by removing one’s own control over action (similarity 0.85)
• Credible commitment requires finding a penalty against one’s own nonperformance (similarity 0.85)
• A threat only coerces when the threatener has visibly left himself no choice (similarity 0.83)
• Deterrent threats can be passive but compellent threats require commitment (similarity 0.83)
• Commitment includes removing options, delegating fulfilment, and self-handicapping (similarity 0.82)
• One player’s promise can worsen the other player’s position (similarity 0.81)
• A threat must be credible and credible threats require commitment (similarity 0.81)
• Failed threats create joint incentives to undo commitments that parties cannot jointly undo (similarity 0.80)
• Commitments, promises, and threats all reduce a player’s own payoffs visibly and irreversibly (similarity 0.80)
• Threats, promises, and commitments unify as payoff-restricting reaction functions (similarity 0.80)
• A credible conditional commitment must combine both a promise and a threat. (similarity 0.80)
• An enforceable promise requires destroying one’s own power not to comply (similarity 0.79)
• A threat binds only if the other believes it cannot be retracted (similarity 0.79)
• Threats only matter when players can irreversibly change the game (similarity 0.79)
• Commitments must be communicated through evidence, not just words. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• A threat to act is only credible if one is committed, not merely willing #expands (0.82) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 414
• Deterrent threats can be passive but compellent threats require commitment #expands (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 438
• Commitments are often manufactured by removing one’s own control over action #corroborates (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 714
• An enforceable promise requires destroying one’s own power not to comply #qualifies (0.72) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 345