A credible threat works precisely because it need never be carried out.

Evidence

The distinctive feature of this threat is that the threatener has no incentive to carry it out either before the event or after. He does have an incentive to bind himself to fulfill the threat, if he thinks the threat may be successful, because the threat and not its fulfillment gains the end; and fulfillment is not required if the threat succeeds. The more certain the contingent fulfillment is, the less likely is actual fulfillment. But the threat’s efficacy depends on the credulity of the other party, and the threat is ineffectual unless the threatener can rearrange or display his own incentives so as to demonstrate that he would, ex post, have an incentive to carry it out. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 96

Categorization

• XREF: Core Schelling mechanism that connects directly to Gambetta’s private-protection model — the enforcer’s threat of violence is credible precisely because it is rarely executed. — connects to: A threat to act is only credible if one is committed, not merely willing — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 414; A threat must be credible and credible threats require commitment — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 23; Hinted threats gain credibility precisely because they are deniable — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 781 (+2 more)

Related

• A threat to act is only credible if one is committed, not merely willing (similarity 0.88)
• Protection demands are credible only when they come from established sources. (similarity 0.87)
• A credible threat can subordinate the final decision to chance outside the threatener’s control (similarity 0.86)
• Credible threats must attach penalties to observable acts, not intentions (similarity 0.85)
• A threat must be credible and credible threats require commitment (similarity 0.85)
• Deterrent threats can be passive but compellent threats require commitment (similarity 0.84)
• A threat only coerces when the threatener has visibly left himself no choice (similarity 0.83)
• Credible threats can require revealing information that defeats the threat (similarity 0.83)
• Small-probability threats are superior to large certain threats in compellence (similarity 0.83)
• A deterrent threat is only credible if control over its triggering is partly surrendered. (similarity 0.82)
• Threatening a small risk beats threatening certainty when the enemy’s controllability is uncertain. (similarity 0.82)
• Credible threats can be conveyed by action rather than verbal pledge (similarity 0.80)
• A credible conditional commitment must combine both a promise and a threat. (similarity 0.80)
• Threats require commitment, not comparative damage to both parties (similarity 0.80)
• Credible commitment requires finding a penalty against one’s own nonperformance (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• A deterrent threat is only too large when its size damages credibility #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 711
• A threat must be credible and credible threats require commitment #expands (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 23
• Hinted threats gain credibility precisely because they are deniable #complicates (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 781
• A threat to act is only credible if one is committed, not merely willing #qualifies (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 414