Commitment strategies require communication and risk provoking stalemate

Evidence

These examples have certain characteristics in common. First, they clearly depend not only on incurring a commitment but on communicating it persuasively to the other party. Second, it is by no means easy to establish the commitment, nor is it entirely clear to either of the parties concerned just how strong the commitment is. Third, similar activity may be available to the parties on both sides. Fourth, the possibility of commitment, though perhaps available to both sides, is by no means equally available; the ability of a democratic government to get itself tied by public opinion may be different from the ability of a totalitarian government to incur such a commitment. Fifth, they all run the risk of establishing an immovable position that goes beyond the ability of the other to concede, and thereby provoke the likelihood of stalemate or breakdown. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 77

Categorization

  • XREF: The five characteristics — especially unequal availability and stalemate risk — map onto why Mafia-style commitment persists where democratic states cannot fully commit: the Don can incur irrevocable obligations that political actors cannot. — connects to: Deterrent threats can be passive but compellent threats require commitment — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 438; Commitment buys first move while threat commits to a second-move response strategy — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 294; Destroying communication can be a winning move in coordination games. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 339 (+2 more)

Broader Connections