A deterrent threat is only credible if control over its triggering is partly surrendered.

Evidence

The critical feature of the analogy, it should be emphasized, is that whether or not the trip wire detonates general war is—at least to some extent—outside our control, and the Russians know it. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 429

Categorization

• XREF: Directly parallels Schelling’s own commitment-device logic and connects to the reader’s framing of credible commitments (Milgrom) — the threat works only because the arbiter can’t turn it off. — connects to: A threat to act is only credible if one is committed, not merely willing — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 414; A threat only coerces when the threatener has visibly left himself no choice — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 293; Deterrent threats can be passive but compellent threats require commitment — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 438 (+4 more)

Related

• Deterrent threats can be passive but compellent threats require commitment (similarity 0.84)
• A credible threat can subordinate the final decision to chance outside the threatener’s control (similarity 0.84)
• Threatening a small risk beats threatening certainty when the enemy’s controllability is uncertain. (similarity 0.83)
• A threat only coerces when the threatener has visibly left himself no choice (similarity 0.83)
• Protection demands are credible only when they come from established sources. (similarity 0.82)
• A credible threat works precisely because it need never be carried out. (similarity 0.82)
• A threat must be credible and credible threats require commitment (similarity 0.82)
• Deterrence can operate as an unintended byproduct of other actions (similarity 0.81)
• A threat to act is only credible if one is committed, not merely willing (similarity 0.81)
• Deterrence rests on surviving retaliation capacity, not on existing destructive capacity. (similarity 0.80)
• A credible conditional commitment must combine both a promise and a threat. (similarity 0.80)
• Small-probability threats are superior to large certain threats in compellence (similarity 0.80)
• Deterrence operates on graduated probability, not a binary trip-wire logic (similarity 0.79)
• Unforeseeable escalation risk alone can deter aggression even among cautious rational actors. (similarity 0.79)
• Credible threats must attach penalties to observable acts, not intentions (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• A credible threat can subordinate the final decision to chance outside the threatener’s control #corroborates (0.90) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 416
• A threat only coerces when the threatener has visibly left himself no choice #corroborates (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 293
• A threat binds only if the other believes it cannot be retracted #corroborates (0.82) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 297
• Deterrent threats can be passive but compellent threats require commitment #expands (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 438
• Threatening a small risk beats threatening certainty when the enemy’s controllability is uncertain. #expands (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 427