A threat binds only if the other believes it cannot be retracted

Evidence

But if we allow Row to make a threat, he declares that he will choose strategy ii unless Column chooses II; that is, he gives Column a choice of ii,I or i,II by committing himself to that conditional choice. If Column went ahead and chose I, of course, Row would prefer to choose i; and they both know it. The tactic succeeds only if Column believes that Row must choose ii in the event of I. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 297

Categorization

  • XREF: This is the mechanics behind Don Corleone’s arbitration power: the Godfather’s threats work because Amèrigo and others believe he is honor-bound to carry them out regardless of cost. — connects to: A deterrent threat is only credible if control over its triggering is partly surrendered. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 429; Both rivals seek a detection advantage while hoping none is found — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 543; A threat only coerces when the threatener has visibly left himself no choice — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 293 (+2 more)

Broader Connections