Credible threats can require revealing information that defeats the threat

Evidence

If in order to prove that one is committed to a threat, or that one is in fact capable of fulfilling the threat, one must display evidence of the commitment or the capability to the other party, the evidence may be of a kind that necessarily yields information helpful to the second party in combatting the threat. To prove to an enemy that one has a potent weapon that can overcome his defenses we might have to demonstrate the weapon or some aspect of it, or provide technical knowledge to prove the weapon feasible; to do so may aid him greatly in preparing a defense against it. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 801

Categorization

• XREF: Connects directly to the reader’s Gambetta/Milgrom framing: demonstrating private enforcement capability — e.g. the Don proving he can make things happen — necessarily leaks how it could be resisted. — connects to: Trustworthy behavior requires some information cost, but imperfect information can suffice. — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 131; Inspection schemes can gather too much information and increase vulnerability — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 558; A threat must be credible and credible threats require commitment — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 23 (+5 more)
• QUESTION: Does this secrecy-vs-revelation dilemma have an analogue in how a Mafia boss displays enforcement capability without exposing his network to prosecutors?

Related

• Credible threats must attach penalties to observable acts, not intentions (similarity 0.85)
• A credible threat works precisely because it need never be carried out. (similarity 0.83)
• Deterrent threats can be passive but compellent threats require commitment (similarity 0.83)
• Threats gain credibility by decomposing into a series of smaller demonstrated steps (similarity 0.82)
• A threat must be credible and credible threats require commitment (similarity 0.82)
• A threat to act is only credible if one is committed, not merely willing (similarity 0.82)
• Commitments must be communicated through evidence, not just words. (similarity 0.82)
• Protection demands are credible only when they come from established sources. (similarity 0.81)
• Delegating decisions to agents makes threats more credible (similarity 0.80)
• A credible threat can subordinate the final decision to chance outside the threatener’s control (similarity 0.79)
• Credible threats can be conveyed by action rather than verbal pledge (similarity 0.79)
• Selecting visibly irrational agents can make threats credible (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Threats gain credibility by decomposing into a series of smaller demonstrated steps #expands (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 107
• Credible threats can be conveyed by action rather than verbal pledge #expands (0.78) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 34
• Delegating decisions to agents makes threats more credible #expands (0.78) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 330
• Selecting visibly irrational agents can make threats credible #expands (0.78) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 332
• A threat must be credible and credible threats require commitment #expands (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 23