A deterrence threat often hurts the threatener as much as the threatened

Evidence

Some aspects of deterrence stand out vividly in child discipline: the importance of rationality and self-discipline on the part of the person to be deterred, of his ability to comprehend the threat if he hears it and to hear it through the din and noise, of the threatener’s determination to fulfill the threat if need be—and, more important, of the threatened party’s conviction that the threat will be carried out. Clearer perhaps in child discipline than in criminal deterrence is the important possibility that the threatened punishment will hurt the threatener as much as it will the one threatened, perhaps more. There is an analogy between a parent’s threat to a child and the threat that a wealthy paternalistic nation makes to the weak and disorganized government of a poor nation in, say, extending foreign aid and demanding “sound” economic policies or cooperative military policies in return. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 32

Categorization

• XREF: The ‘hurts the threatener as much as the threatened’ point is the core of the credibility problem Schelling develops — directly relevant to the Mafia’s hostage/godfather-bond mutual-cost mechanisms the reader maps onto. — connects to: Unforeseeable escalation risk alone can deter aggression even among cautious rational actors. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 430; Deterrent threats can be passive but compellent threats require commitment — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 438; Publicly known reluctance to strike first paradoxically deters the enemy. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 525 (+3 more)

Related

• Deterrent threats can be passive but compellent threats require commitment (similarity 0.80)
• A deterrent threat is only too large when its size damages credibility (similarity 0.80)
• A credible threat works precisely because it need never be carried out. (similarity 0.79)
• Threats fail against irrational adversaries and trapped opponents (similarity 0.79)
• A threat only coerces when the threatener has visibly left himself no choice (similarity 0.78)
• Threats require commitment, not comparative damage to both parties (similarity 0.78)