Credible threats can be conveyed by action rather than verbal pledge

Evidence

Collision being about as mutual as anything can be, and often the only thing that one can threaten, the maneuvers by which one conveys a threat of mutual damage to another driver aggressing on one’s right of way are an instructive example of the kind of threat that is conveyed not by words but by actions, and of the threat in which the pledge to fulfill is made not by verbal announcement but by losing the power to do otherwise. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 34

Categorization

• XREF: The ‘losing the power to do otherwise’ is Schelling’s commitment mechanism — the same logic by which a Mafia boss makes the godfather-bond credible by rendering the cost of defection unavoidable. — connects to: A threat to act is only credible if one is committed, not merely willing — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 414; Deterrent threats can be passive but compellent threats require commitment — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 438; Hinted threats gain credibility precisely because they are deniable — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 781 (+16 more)

Related

• A threat must be credible and credible threats require commitment (similarity 0.86)
• A threat to act is only credible if one is committed, not merely willing (similarity 0.84)
• Deterrent threats can be passive but compellent threats require commitment (similarity 0.84)
• Credible threats must attach penalties to observable acts, not intentions (similarity 0.83)
• Commitments must be communicated through evidence, not just words. (similarity 0.83)
• Willing martyrdom acts as the ultimate credibility-enhancing display (similarity 0.83)
• Credible commitment requires finding a penalty against one’s own nonperformance (similarity 0.82)
• A threat only coerces when the threatener has visibly left himself no choice (similarity 0.82)
• Protection demands are credible only when they come from established sources. (similarity 0.82)
• A credible threat works precisely because it need never be carried out. (similarity 0.80)
• Threats gain credibility by decomposing into a series of smaller demonstrated steps (similarity 0.80)
• A non-costly action can still credibly signal sincere belief. (similarity 0.80)
• A credible conditional commitment must combine both a promise and a threat. (similarity 0.79)
• Credible threats can require revealing information that defeats the threat (similarity 0.79)
• A credible threat can subordinate the final decision to chance outside the threatener’s control (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Threats gain credibility by decomposing into a series of smaller demonstrated steps #expands (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 107