Ernst Fehr — Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms

28 published claims from this book.

• A punisher’s own gains do not reduce punishment of unrelated violators.
• An impartial third party who punishes at personal cost demonstrates strong reciprocity.
• Contemplating hypothetical unfairness triggers weaker emotions than experiencing real violations.
• Cooperative individuals sanction defectors far more than defectors do
• Cooperative punishers may empathize with outside victims of defection.
• Costly norm enforcement by unaffected bystanders reveals strong reciprocity.
• Dictators shift their modal transfer only after experiencing punishment firsthand.
• Different social-preference models make distinguishable predictions about who punishes.
• Directly harmed victims punish more strongly than unaffected third parties.
• Emotions like anger drive and independently cost norm enforcement
• Even inequality-aversion models fail to explain punishment that is costly to the punisher
• Even unaffected bystanders punish norm violations at personal cost.
• Higher monetary stakes rarely change mean experimental outcomes.
• Impartial third parties punish norm violators at personal cost.
• Multiple third-party punishers can make norm violations unprofitable, acting as strong norm enforcers.
• People punish norm violations at personal cost even without direct harm
• Researchers distinguish punishment by a harmed party from punishment by an unaffected third party.
• Second-party sanctions are contaminated by self-interest; third-party sanctions reveal true norms.
• Self-reported emotions correlate with but cannot prove punitive sanctioning
• Social norm effects hinge on beliefs that others will enforce them.
• Social norm enforcement may be a defining trait of humanity.
• Social norms remain one of the least understood forces in the behavioral sciences.
• Third parties punish inequality even when it does not directly involve them.
• Third-party punishment context reduces the number of punishers who sanction selfish transfers.
• Third-party punishment games enable empirical study of social norms.
• Third-party punishment is weaker than second-party punishment.
• Third-party punishment renders defection in a one-shot dyadic exchange unprofitable.
• Third-party punishment scales with how far selfish transfers fall short of fairness norms.