Cooperative individuals sanction defectors far more than defectors do
Evidence
Thus, cooperators punished defectors much more in the SP condition than in the TP condition, whereas defectors punish defectors to roughly the same extent across conditions. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 133
Categorization
- XREF: connects to: Cooperative punishers may empathize with outside victims of defection. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 124; Groups induce cooperation through sanctions even without trusting their members — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 808; Cooperation norms persist through credible punishment of defectors. — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 193 (+4 more)
Related
- Cooperative punishers may empathize with outside victims of defection. (similarity 0.90)
- Cooperation norms persist through credible punishment of defectors. (similarity 0.85)
- Sanctions either alter egoistic utilities or provide assurance to cooperative agents. (similarity 0.83)
- Costly norm enforcement by unaffected bystanders reveals strong reciprocity. (similarity 0.82)
- Multiple third-party punishers can make norm violations unprofitable, acting as strong norm enforcers. (similarity 0.82)
- Even unaffected bystanders punish norm violations at personal cost. (similarity 0.82)
- Second-party sanctions are contaminated by self-interest; third-party sanctions reveal true norms. (similarity 0.81)
- Explaining how cooperative groups formed requires enforcement mechanisms, not just expulsion of the asocial. (similarity 0.81)
- Third-party punishment renders defection in a one-shot dyadic exchange unprofitable. (similarity 0.80)
- An impartial third party who punishes at personal cost demonstrates strong reciprocity. (similarity 0.79)
- Cooperation is stabilized either by punishing cheaters or by exiting to new partners. (similarity 0.79)
- Sanctions make trustworthiness a matter of self-interest rather than personal concern (similarity 0.79)
- Third-party punishment games enable empirical study of social norms. (similarity 0.79)
- People punish norm violations at personal cost even without direct harm (similarity 0.79)
- Groups induce cooperation through sanctions even without trusting their members (similarity 0.78)
Broader Connections
- Cooperation norms persist through credible punishment of defectors.
#corroborates(0.90) — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 193 - Groups induce cooperation through sanctions even without trusting their members
#corroborates(0.85) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 808 - Costly norm enforcement by unaffected bystanders reveals strong reciprocity.
#expands(0.80) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2 - Egoistic motivations alone cannot sustain cooperation without plausible self-regulating structures
#corroborates(0.80) - Hobbesian sanctions produce egoistic macro-motivation to cooperate
#corroborates(0.75) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 194