Third-party punishment renders defection in a one-shot dyadic exchange unprofitable.
Evidence
The numbers in Tables 5 and 6 imply that defection was not profitable for the defector in the SP condition: the defector’s average income was reduced by 38.4 = 25.2 points, whereas the gain from defection was only 10, generating a net loss of 15.2 points. Therefore, cooperation was the better choice from a purely monetary viewpoint. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 117
Categorization
- XREF: Supports the reader’s image-scoring framework: a community with a visible reputation scaffold (Hester’s scar) can police one-shot interactions where direct retaliation is impossible—the exact condition under which third-party enforcement matters. — connects to: Third-party punishment games enable empirical study of social norms. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2; Third-party punishment is weaker than second-party punishment. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 82; Cooperation norms persist through credible punishment of defectors. — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 193 (+4 more)
Related
- Third-party punishment games enable empirical study of social norms. (similarity 0.83)
- Multiple third-party punishers can make norm violations unprofitable, acting as strong norm enforcers. (similarity 0.82)
- Third-party punishment is weaker than second-party punishment. (similarity 0.82)
- Cooperative individuals sanction defectors far more than defectors do (similarity 0.80)
- Even inequality-aversion models fail to explain punishment that is costly to the punisher (similarity 0.79)
- Cooperative punishers may empathize with outside victims of defection. (similarity 0.78)
Broader Connections
- Cooperation norms persist through credible punishment of defectors.
#expands(0.75) — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 193