Perceived ownership rights, not raw fairness, determine ultimatum-game rejection rates.
Evidence
If player one perceives himself as having ownership rights over the stake, then … low offers would be acceptable to both giver and receiver. This would explain why many player twos accepted low offers. On the other hand, if ownership is construed as joint, then … low offers would be more likely to be rejected as a violation of fairness norms, explaining why some players do reject offers up to fifty percent of the stake. (Lesorogol, forthcoming) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 130
Categorization
- XREF: Directly parallel to the fumi-e reading: the trampling ritual re-codes ownership/joint ownership of religious commitment, shifting which apostasies count as fair. — connects to: Fairness in economic games tracks perceived entitlement rather than raw contribution. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 467; Dictator-game choices reflect competing theories of rights, not selfishness. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 123; Seemingly fair outcomes can arise from self-referent loss aversion rather than fairness preferences. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 312 (+1 more)
- SEED: Angles for a piece on how ‘rights over the stake’ — whether a relationship, a faith, or an inheritance — sets which behaviors others accept as legitimate.
Related
- Fairness in economic games tracks perceived entitlement rather than raw contribution. (similarity 0.85)
- Dictator-game choices reflect competing theories of rights, not selfishness. (similarity 0.83)
- Fairness judgments track each participant’s earned contribution, not just payoff equality. (similarity 0.79)
- Seemingly fair outcomes can arise from self-referent loss aversion rather than fairness preferences. (similarity 0.78)
Broader Connections
- Seemingly fair outcomes can arise from self-referent loss aversion rather than fairness preferences.
#complicates(0.75) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 312 - Costly norm enforcement by unaffected bystanders reveals strong reciprocity.
#exemplifies(0.72) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2