Third-party punishment can stabilize any cultural trait within a group
Evidence
Hypothesis 3: Third-party punishment. Scholars from economics, anthropology, and biology have suggested that third-party punishment (also called moralistic reciprocity) may account for the maintenance of group norms (Binmore 1994; Hirshleifer and Rasmussen 1988) and, consequently, the similarity within groups and the differences between groups. This hypothesis proposes that humans possess a reliably developing neural encoding that compels them both to punish individuals who violate group norms (common beliefs or practices) and punish individuals who do not punish norm violators—the punishment of nonpunishers. Boyd and Richerson (1992b; see Binmore and Hirshleifer and Rasmussen for analogous results in economics) have shown that punishment can stabilize group beneficial behaviors and any other cultural trait within a group. By punishing norm violators and nonpunishers of norm violators, punishment can maintain any belief or practice ranging from such odd behaviors as wearing uncomfortable neck ties and tipping at restaurants, to charging an entrenched enemy under fire or eating the brains of dead relatives. — Joe Henrich and Robert Boyd, The Evolution of Conformist…, 117
Categorization
- XREF: This is the foundational Boyd-Richerson framework that directly foreshadows the coercion-vulnerability material in Henrich’s later book — relevant to the reader’s stated purpose. — connects to: Third-party punishment games enable empirical study of social norms. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2; Cultural beliefs about supernatural punishment can suppress aggression into adulthood — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement: How People Do Harm…, 169; Prejudice is a cultural mechanism protecting dominant groups’ privileges — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 653 (+10 more)
Broader Connections
- Cultural evolution can lock groups into maladaptive equilibria, not just prosocial ones
#complicates(0.92) - Conformist transmission may be the evolutionary foundation for third-party punishment.
#expands(0.85) — Joe Henrich and Robert Boyd, The Evolution of Conformist…, 119 - Punishing minority defendants can function to preserve existing social hierarchies
#exemplifies(0.80) — Joseph Avery, Jim Sidanius, Joel Cooper, Gregory Davis, Amanda N., Bias in the Law, 873 - Cultural beliefs about supernatural punishment can suppress aggression into adulthood
#exemplifies(0.78) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 169 - Isolated subgroups sustain prejudicial norms that mainstream culture rejects
#exemplifies(0.78) - Third-party punishment games enable empirical study of social norms.
#expands(0.75) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2 - Group-based discipline can coerce as powerfully as individual violence
#qualifies(0.75) — , The Rod and the Child, 5601 - Cultural selection and genetic adaptation theories of supernatural punishment differ fundamentally
#expands(0.75) — Norenzayan, Ara, Big gods - how religion transformed…, 443 - Benevolent paternalism can coopt minority-group members into their own subordination
#exemplifies(0.74) — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 140 - Cultures breed aggression where it is modeled, prestiged, and functionally rewarded
#qualifies(0.73) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 162 - Prejudice is a cultural mechanism protecting dominant groups’ privileges
#exemplifies(0.72) — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 653 - Confucian-heritage societies can fully prohibit corporal punishment without cultural betrayal
#exemplifies(0.72) — , The Rod and the Child, 5506 - Self-regulation, not fairness alone, enables prosocial culture.
#qualifies(0.72) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 250