Norenzayan, Ara — Big gods - how religion transformed cooperation and conflict

Yield

571 of 1340 paragraphs kept (42.6%). Target for mining: 30%–50% — on target.

Pre-Assessment

Ara Norenzayan is a professor of social psychology at the University of British Columbia and a leading researcher in the cognitive science of religion. “Big Gods” (2013) synthesizes his own experiments and a broad cross-disciplinary literature (cultural evolution, comparative religion, historical records) into the argument that belief in morally-invested, omniscient deities (“Big Gods”) was a culturally-evolved mechanism that enabled large-scale cooperation among strangers, and that declines in religiosity are compensated by secular institutions of surveillance and enforcement. It’s current as of its 2013 publication; the core thesis has been widely debated but remains influential.

Given your mining stance and analytical-integration purpose, the yield here is predominantly concepts/frameworks: the “Big God” mechanism, the distinction between supernatural punishment and supernatural monitoring, and how omniscient surveillance substitutes for costly enforcement in large groups. It’s not a book of raw facts/data — the evidence is illustrative rather than exhaustive — and it doesn’t offer much straight inspiration. The fumi-e and Japanese anti-Christian persecution are actually among the cases the book discusses, so you’ll find direct material linking surveillance-type religious cognition to ritual apostasy — which maps well onto the Rodrigues / Baumard partner-choice tension you’re integrating. Skim the chapters on “Supernatural Monitoring” and the Japanese counter-evidence rather than reading cover-to-cover.

Reading Goal

Prioritizing: Causal Relationships (Core purpose is mapping causal mechanisms: omniscient gaze enforces behavior, public trampling destroys partner choice and solidarity.), Connection Points (Purpose is explicitly cross-source integration—linking Norenzayan, Baumard, and the novel’s narrative events.), Factual Claims (Reader is integrating specific scholarly mechanisms (Big God, partner choice) and needs factual grounding to test the analytical bridge.), Definitional Content (Key concepts (fumi-e, Big God, partner choice, apostasy) require precise definitions to anchor the cross-textual argument.), Contrarian or Surprising Claims (The counter-intuitive inversion (religious authority weaponizing public display) is central to the analytical claim.) De-prioritizing: Craft and Method (Reading for conceptual integration, not literary technique; craft details are secondary to the mechanism-tracing.), Inspiration and Speculation (Analysis is deductive and evidence-driven, not exploratory or generative; speculation would dilute the argument.)

Thesis

Religious behavior depends on situational context, observable action, and intergroup competition · ch. 4

Argument

  1. Secular cooperative societies emerged through institutions that displaced religion — ch. 5
  2. Observable religious commitment signals produce trust among believers — ch. 5
  3. The Oneida Perfectionists lasted only 33 years before splintering. — ch. 5
  4. Durkheim’s tradition treated god-belief as tangential to religion’s social function — ch. 5
  5. Big Gods proliferated only where kin monitoring and reputation were insufficient — ch. 5
  6. Omniscient watchful gods enabled cooperation among anonymous strangers — ch. 5
  7. Fear of watchful gods measurably increased within-group cooperation and trust — ch. 5
  8. The worldwide major religions began as obscure local cultural experiments — ch. 5
  9. People cooperate more when they expect repeated dealings or know a partner’s reputation — ch. 5
  10. Proselytizing religions both created large-scale cooperation and spread globally — ch. 5
  11. Human cooperation scales with genetic relatedness under Hamilton’s rule — ch. 5
  12. Large anonymous communities emerged as a very recent blip in human evolutionary history. — ch. 5
  13. Studying only surviving religions introduces survivor bias — ch. 5
  14. Genetic relatedness predicts how much humans help one another. — ch. 5
  15. Secular institutions can replace religion’s community-building and cooperation functions — ch. 5
  16. Hard-to-fake devotion rituals screened out religious freeloaders — ch. 5
  17. Policing institutions substitute for kin-based altruism where populations are genetically diverse. — ch. 5
  18. Pentecostalism now rivals established Christian denominations with 125 million followers — ch. 5
  19. Early hunter-gatherer gods cared about ritual, not moral behavior. — ch. 5
  20. Ordinary cognition, not special modules, produces religious beliefs — ch. 5
  21. Belief-as-accident and belief-as-glue are rival traditions that need integration. — ch. 5
  22. Neither kin selection nor reciprocal altruism can explain human ultra-sociality toward strangers — ch. 5
  23. Secularization predictions failed; most people across societies remain deeply religious. — ch. 5
  24. Suspicion of strangers was the human default before large-scale societies — ch. 5
  25. Religious belief and social belonging form one integrated system. — ch. 5
  26. Belief in watchful gods and ritual belonging function as one integrated system — ch. 5
  27. Most religions fail and vanish; only a few survive. — ch. 5
  28. Believers extend more trust to people showing God commitment — ch. 5
  29. Big Gods and large-scale cooperation mutually reinforced each other’s expansion — ch. 5
  30. Neither kin selection nor reciprocal altruism can explain large-scale human cooperation. — ch. 5
  31. Big Gods were necessary but not sufficient for group expansion. — ch. 5
  32. Supernatural policing may solve the infinite regress of punishing punishers — ch. 5
  33. Prosocial religions produce large-scale cooperation and then spread culturally — ch. 5
  34. Reputation and anticipated repeat interactions drive stranger cooperation from the first round. — ch. 5
  35. The most culturally successful supernatural beliefs mildly violate intuitive expectations. — ch. 6
  36. Costly behaviors transmit beliefs because they prove honest commitment — ch. 6
  37. Gods who see everything derive from humans who watch each other — ch. 6
  38. Belief in gods emerges from ordinary cognition, not dedicated brain machinery — ch. 6
  39. Mentalizing enables believers to interact with and be policed by gods — ch. 6
  40. Even three dots suggesting eyes reduce selfish behavior in economic games. — ch. 6
  41. God concepts recruit existing social-monitoring circuits rather than special brain hardware — ch. 6
  42. Majority and elite endorsement boosts a religious belief’s cultural spread. — ch. 6
  43. Mentalizing capacities are cognitive foundations for belief in God — ch. 6
  44. Eye detection is an ancient, automatic evolutionary adaptation for reputation monitoring — ch. 6
  45. Ordeals worked only because defendants believed in an omniscient moral watcher — ch. 6
  46. Mind-body dualism naturally prepares minds to accept the immortal soul — ch. 6
  47. Subtle eye images alone curb cheating even with no real observer present — ch. 6
  48. Mere perceived visibility changes prosocial norms even without actual observation — ch. 6
  49. Reduced mentalizing capacity directly lowers belief in God — ch. 6
  50. Even believers affirming divine omniscience intuitively treat God as limited — ch. 6
  51. Thinking about God activates the same brain regions as mind perception — ch. 6
  52. People with autism have more difficulty perceiving minds and believing in gods — ch. 6
  53. People apply the same mental machinery to supernatural watchers as human watchers — ch. 6
  54. Teleological intuitions persist even in scientists and resist science education — ch. 6
  55. Believers implicitly represent even an omniscient God as having humanlike mental limits — ch. 6
  56. Surviving supernatural beliefs mildly violate intuitive expectations rather than wildly or never doing so — ch. 6
  57. Subtle cues of being watched increase generosity by 55 percent. — ch. 6
  58. Illusory anonymity shifts moral norms, not merely behavior amounts — ch. 6
  59. Even subliminal eye images triple honest payment on an honor system. — ch. 6
  60. Ordeals emerged where evidence-gathering mechanisms were unavailable to judges — ch. 6
  61. Elevated gods better serve as overseers because height enables unobstructed watching — ch. 6
  62. Undermining anonymity reliably increases prosocial behavior across experiments — ch. 6
  63. Watching gods correlated with large-scale agricultural cooperation in early civilizations — ch. 6
  64. Abrahamic scripture’s defining trait is a God who observes all acts without exception. — ch. 6
  65. Supernatural agency beliefs filter through evolved person-perception psychology — ch. 6
  66. Cultural learning skills drove rapid human adaptation across all habitats — ch. 6
  67. The trial by ordeal outperformed torture as a guilt-detection technique — ch. 6
  68. Lay believers perceive God as a personlike mind, not an abstract force — ch. 6
  69. Social monitoring alone cannot sustain cooperation in large anonymous groups — ch. 6
  70. Mere perceived surveillance, without reward or punishment, motivates prosocial behavior — ch. 6
  71. Perceived surveillance reliably boosts prosocial behavior in daily life — ch. 6
  72. Even scientists fall back into purpose-driven thinking under time pressure — ch. 6
  73. Believing in God is inseparable from anthropomorphizing God as a personlike mind — ch. 6
  74. Belief in supernatural watchers depends on both intuitive cognition and cultural transmission — ch. 6
  75. Mental faculties enable gods to act as supernatural monitors of behavior — ch. 6
  76. Individual variation in cognitive intuitions predicts supernatural belief strength — ch. 6
  77. Personal religiosity is unrelated to generosity in economic games. — ch. 7
  78. The mere belief a supernatural agent is watching deters cheating even among children — ch. 7
  79. Being watched by God intensifies awareness of social surveillance on Sundays — ch. 7
  80. Western industrialized populations are psychological outliers at the extreme end of a human spectrum — ch. 7
  81. Big God omniscience is not automatically and constantly effective on behavior — ch. 7
  82. Secular moral authority primes generosity as much as God does. — ch. 7
  83. People over-attribute behavior to character rather than situational pressures. — ch. 7
  84. Unconscious thoughts of God increase generosity in economic games — ch. 7
  85. Religion shapes behavior only when situational cues make it salient. — ch. 7
  86. Believers hold fluctuating and conflicting beliefs about divine punishment — ch. 7
  87. Christians give 300 percent more to charity on Sundays than other days. — ch. 7
  88. Religious priming effects are testable against the ideomotor alternative — ch. 7
  89. Experimental cheating paradigms create measurable opportunities to cheat for reward — ch. 7
  90. Effective secular institutions drive religious decline by taking over its function. — ch. 7
  91. Believing God is punishing deters cheating more than believing God is kind — ch. 7
  92. Reminders of God may curb selfishness and increase generosity toward strangers. — ch. 7
  93. National belief in hell correlates with lower crime more than belief in God itself. — ch. 7
  94. Prosperous religious groups deliberately surround members with constant reminders to sustain cooperation — ch. 7
  95. God-priming shifted the dominant norm from selfishness to equal splitting. — ch. 7
  96. Religious prosocial effects are muted where secular institutions already generate trust. — ch. 7
  97. The null effects of religiosity on prosocial behavior reflect biased sampling of university students — ch. 7
  98. God priming increases both generosity and felt watching only in believers — ch. 7
  99. Religious primes fail to affect atheists, disproving a purely ideomotor account — ch. 7
  100. Chronic, communal, in-group religious practice drives the prosociality effect — ch. 7
  101. Even a casually mentioned dead student’s ghost deters cheating among university students — ch. 7
  102. Thoughts of watchful gods make people behave prosocially even when anonymous — ch. 7
  103. Moral beliefs influence action only when momentarily cognitively salient, not merely held. — ch. 7
  104. Supernatural monitoring and ideomotor theories make opposite predictions about divine temperament — ch. 7
  105. Believing a supernatural agent watches reduces cheating in children and adults — ch. 7
  106. Believers hold fluctuating, conflicting views of God’s temperament — ch. 7
  107. Nonconscious religious primes reliably affect believers but only inconsistently affect atheists. — ch. 7
  108. Belief that God punishes reduces people’s willingness to punish wrongdoers themselves. — ch. 7
  109. Self-reported religiosity predicts prosociality only outside secular Western societies — ch. 7
  110. Unconscious God-priming in word games raised Dictator Game giving. — ch. 7
  111. Religious observance shifts the timing of sin rather than reducing its total — ch. 7
  112. Belief in a punishing afterlife predicts lower crime rates than belief in heaven does. — ch. 7
  113. Priming reminders activate religious moral behavior; beliefs alone do not — ch. 7
  114. Believing God punishes reduces humans’ own costly punishment of norm violators — ch. 7
  115. Primed concepts unconsciously increase matching behaviors such as walking slowly or interrupting — ch. 7
  116. Omniscient-god beliefs only change behavior when the deity is actively on the believer’s mind. — ch. 7
  117. Subliminal God reminders increase costly punishment of free-riders among religious believers. — ch. 7
  118. Omniscient God thoughts are situationally activated, not chronically present — ch. 7
  119. Religious situations boost prosociality more than personal devotion does — ch. 7
  120. Supernatural monitoring caused the God-prosociality association, not the reverse — ch. 7
  121. Market integration and Big God religion independently predict prosocial generosity cross-culturally — ch. 7
  122. Vengeful Gods make more potent moral monitors than kind Gods — ch. 7
  123. Unconscious God reminders deter cheating while personal religiosity does not — ch. 7
  124. Religious-belief effects are testable through temporary thought-priming experiments — ch. 7
  125. Benevolent God concepts fail to suppress antisocial behavior, unlike punishing gods. — ch. 7
  126. Anti-atheist prejudice is socially accepted while racial prejudice is not — ch. 8
  127. Believers are broadly trusted more than disbelievers in religious-majority societies — ch. 8
  128. Anti-atheist prejudice tracks wherever religious majorities dominate — ch. 8
  129. Anti-atheist bias is America’s one socially accepted prejudice — ch. 8
  130. Atheism is more disqualifying for US voters than race, gender, or sexuality — ch. 8
  131. Cultural selection shaped psychology to read supernatural-belief cues for trustworthiness — ch. 8
  132. Belief in any moralizing deity signals trustworthiness to strangers — ch. 8
  133. Supernatural monitoring, not moral emotions alone, scaled prosociality to mass societies — ch. 8
  134. Religions evolved to sprinkle situational reminders because internalized monitoring is hard to sustain — ch. 8
  135. Religious institutions shared merchant courier networks to police member identity — ch. 8
  136. Armenian silk traders sustained 300 years of commerce without a state — ch. 8
  137. Compassion drives prosocial behavior in nonbelievers but not believers — ch. 8
  138. Strong secular institutions raise trust and cooperation for believers and nonbelievers alike — ch. 8
  139. Belief in supernatural watchers enables stranger-to-stranger cooperation — ch. 8
  140. Distrust of atheists exceeds distrust of Muslims despite atheists posing no external threat — ch. 8
  141. Atheists remain the only US group most voters refuse to support — ch. 8
  142. Divine witnesses to oaths were the core of Greco-Roman marketplace commerce — ch. 8
  143. Supernatural monitoring by any religion can extend trust beyond one’s own community — ch. 8
  144. Survey self-reports are unreliable proxies for actual religious trust behavior — ch. 8
  145. Religious believers infer atheists threaten cooperation in large groups — ch. 8
  146. Any genuine religious belief signals trustworthiness, not just one’s own church. — ch. 8
  147. Religious belief only boosts prosociality where state institutions are weak — ch. 8
  148. Anti-atheist prejudice falls out of supernatural-monitoring trust logic — ch. 8
  149. Worldwide atheists would rank as the fourth largest religion — ch. 8
  150. Belief in a supernatural monitor lowers the cost of trusting strangers in trade networks — ch. 8
  151. Religious clergy functioned to police members’ identity and donations within trade networks. — ch. 8
  152. Visible church membership historically signaled trustworthiness in anonymous American commerce. — ch. 8
  153. Supernatural monitoring drove human groups to scale from small bands to vast societies — ch. 8
  154. Atheists remain the only US minority group that lacks majority social acceptance — ch. 8
  155. Global trust in religion far exceeds trust in government — ch. 8
  156. Social pressure biases atheism counts in opposite directions by society type — ch. 8
  157. Church membership historically functioned as a reliability signal in business — ch. 8
  158. Historic Christian doctrine held atheists incapable of honoring social bonds — ch. 8
  159. Believers’ antagonism tracks perceived threat to group cooperation — ch. 8
  160. Prosocial religions succeeded by bundling several psychological mechanisms into religious solidarity — ch. 8
  161. Anti-atheist hostility is not simply generalized prejudice — ch. 8
  162. Armenian silk merchants sustained three centuries of cross-imperial trade via church-linked monitoring — ch. 8
  163. Discriminatory laws against atheists span many religious-majority countries — ch. 8
  164. Being an openly atheist American politician is electoral poison — ch. 8
  165. Supernatural beliefs both motivate and signal prosocial intention across social contexts — ch. 8
  166. Moral emotions alone could not have scaled human cooperation to mass societies — ch. 8
  167. Long-distance trade required religious solidarity and watchful gods to sustain trust — ch. 8
  168. Religious belief self-enforces contracts better than secular institutions do — ch. 8
  169. Religious commitment to rival gods still signals trustworthiness to believers and even nonbelievers — ch. 8
  170. Prosociality arises from many sources besides religious supernatural monitoring — ch. 8
  171. Religious trust extends to any outgroup holding supernatural sanctioning beliefs — ch. 8
  172. Big Gods substituted for courts and police in binding strangers into cooperation — ch. 8
  173. Situational religious reminders, not personal religiosity, drive prosocial behavior — ch. 8
  174. Religious cues elicit prosociality only toward perceived co-religionists — ch. 8
  175. Big God believers are more generous than local-god believers cross-culturally — ch. 8
  176. Atheists lack the cohesive community that belief-based groups share — ch. 8
  177. Trade networks spread Islam across Africa and Southeast Asia more than armies did — ch. 8
  178. Enlightenment founders excluded atheists from the tolerance they championed — ch. 8
  179. Believing in the wrong god is more acceptable than believing in none. — ch. 8
  180. Fear of god functioned historically as the sole trust mechanism among strangers — ch. 8
  181. Strangers perceived as religious are trusted with more money — ch. 8
  182. Believers read explicit atheism as a public signal of untrustworthiness — ch. 8
  183. Religious homogeneity increases cooperative behavior among strangers — ch. 8
  184. Fear of divine punishment sustains voluntary labor in coconut courier networks — ch. 8
  185. Atheists are distrusted more than other stigmatized groups even amid rising tolerance — ch. 9
  186. Belief in God’s existence, not lifestyle, drives outgroup distrust. — ch. 9
  187. Perceived atheist prevalence directly reduces anti-atheist prejudice across nations and experiments — ch. 9
  188. Secular-authority effects on prejudice may be group-specific, not general — ch. 9
  189. Anti-atheist discrimination emerges only where trust in strangers matters — ch. 9
  190. Distrust of atheists by believers is one-directional and deeply asymmetrical — ch. 9
  191. Surveillance only substitutes for religious authority where the state itself is trusted — ch. 9
  192. Secular rule of law independently reduces believers’ distrust of atheists — ch. 9
  193. Gods and governments may be interchangeable enforcers of cooperation — ch. 9
  194. Prejudice splits into perceived warmth and competence dimensions — ch. 9
  195. Prejudice toward groups rises with their local prevalence when fear drives it. — ch. 9
  196. Reminders of effective secular authority specifically reduce distrust of atheists — ch. 9
  197. Believers distrust atheists because they doubt atheists feel watched by God. — ch. 9
  198. Effective secular monitoring can erode the root cause of atheist distrust. — ch. 9
  199. Strong secular institutions reduce believers’ need to distrust atheists — ch. 9
  200. Distrust of atheists is rooted in religious prosociality and narrowly context-specific — ch. 9
  201. Secular institutions, atheist prevalence, and religiosity decline reinforce each other in a self-amplifying loop — ch. 9
  202. The believer-disbeliever trust asymmetry is not ordinary ingroup-outgroup antagonism — ch. 9
  203. Anti-atheist prejudice cannot be explained by xenophobia or general outgroup distrust. — ch. 9
  204. Anti-atheist distrust stems from the belief that atheists lack supernatural accountability — ch. 9
  205. Distrust of atheists exceeds what warmth and competence stereotypes alone predict — ch. 9
  206. Atheists are specifically distrusted as moral freeloaders, not disliked generally — ch. 9
  207. Anti-atheist and anti-gay prejudice are rooted in different psychological sentiments. — ch. 9
  208. Visibility campaigns reduce prejudice by making a concealable group’s size known — ch. 9
  209. Religious similarity serves as a trust cue that excludes atheists — ch. 9
  210. Ingroup-threat explanations fail to explain atheist distrust deeper than Muslims’ or gay men’s — ch. 9
  211. Supernatural monitoring beliefs drive atheist distrust even without ingroup membership — ch. 9
  212. Secular institutions and watchful gods are interchangeable in enforcing cooperation and trust — ch. 9
  213. Surveillance alone cannot substitute for religion; only trusted secular authority does. — ch. 9
  214. Distrust of atheists depends on perceiving them as rare, not merely immoral. — ch. 9
  215. American distrust of atheists significantly exceeds that of comparable wealthy democracies. — ch. 9
  216. Atheist distrust stems specifically from moral distrust, not fear or disgust — ch. 9
  217. Secular rule of law substitutes for religious monitoring of believers — ch. 9
  218. The representativeness heuristic can be repurposed as a covert measure of implicit group stereotypes — ch. 9
  219. Anti-atheist prejudice stems from distrust while anti-gay prejudice stems from disgust. — ch. 9
  220. The conjunction fallacy works only when a description matches perceived group stereotypes. — ch. 9
  221. Global religiosity remains stable despite European secularization — ch. 9
  222. Distrust of atheists stems from watching-God beliefs, not ingroup defense. — ch. 9
  223. Atheists are intuitively distrusted as severely as rapists in experiments. — ch. 9
  224. Antipathy toward atheists stems from religious distrust, not general dislike — ch. 9
  225. American atheist distrust stems from anomalous high religiosity — ch. 9
  226. Overt self-reporting of prejudice is contaminated by social-desirability concerns — ch. 9
  227. The religious-atheist trust gap is not symmetric ingroup-outgroup prejudice — ch. 9
  228. Atheists are distrusted as norm-wildcards whose beliefs cannot be inferred — ch. 9
  229. Costly signaling cannot explain why nonbelievers find religious displays costly — ch. 10
  230. Religious group survival advantages stem from costly member requirements — ch. 10
  231. Religious reminders boost self-control but a controlling God reduces goal pursuit — ch. 10
  232. Witnessing credible public commitment, not cognitive content, distinguishes gods from fictional characters — ch. 10
  233. Fictive kinship terminology activates altruistic norms toward co-religionists — ch. 10
  234. Emotionally charged stories spread farther than factually accurate ones — ch. 10
  235. Prosocial religions extend kinship language and psychology to co-religionists — ch. 10
  236. Religious rituals were assembled by cultural evolution, not genetic adaptation. — ch. 10
  237. Self-castration sects attracted up to 100,000 followers across class lines — ch. 10
  238. Emotional wording of risk changes consumer behavior that factual wording does not — ch. 10
  239. Costly religious signals induce cooperation without spreading belief — ch. 10
  240. Islamic conversion in Africa spread via the economic trust its institutions enabled. — ch. 10
  241. Shared synchronous ritual synchronizes the heart rates of participants and their kin — ch. 10
  242. Belief-commitment, not mental representation alone, distinguishes worshipped gods — ch. 10
  243. Ideas that violate folk intuitions spread only with heavy institutional support — ch. 10
  244. Public displays of devotion sustain belief in a god while their absence erodes it — ch. 10
  245. Psychology long neglected the scientific study of religion entirely — ch. 10
  246. Costly religious displays evolved as honest signals of group commitment. — ch. 10
  247. Freeloading hypocrites must be screened out or prosocial religious groups collapse — ch. 10
  248. Credible displays of religious devotion trigger belief cascades and group-level competitive advantage — ch. 10
  249. Witnessing extravagant religious displays causes cultural contagion of belief — ch. 10
  250. CRED-backed belief spreads via transmission advantage and outcompetes rival groups — ch. 10
  251. Belief acquisition depends on who is believed more than what is believed. — ch. 10
  252. Extravagant religious displays function as hard-to-fake signals of commitment — ch. 10
  253. Cultural learning, not cognitive features, determines which gods people commit to — ch. 10
  254. Emotional charge makes stories spread regardless of factual accuracy — ch. 10
  255. Costly commitments only build solidarity when backed by supernatural monitoring — ch. 10
  256. Ritual synchrony alone generates trust and reduces freeriding among participants — ch. 10
  257. Adult social proof, not representability, sustains supernatural belief — ch. 10
  258. Successful fairy tales contain two to three counterintuitive violations — ch. 10
  259. Commitment to a god and belief in that god are separable mental states. — ch. 10
  260. Emotional labels change consumer behavior where scientific names do not — ch. 10
  261. Religious belief is a by-product of cognitive predispositions, not an evolved adaptation — ch. 10
  262. Mildly counterintuitive content boosts cultural transmission of ideas — ch. 10
  263. Acting in synchrony with others raises individual pain tolerance and self-control — ch. 10
  264. Costly public displays reliably signal otherwise unfakeable genuine belief — ch. 10
  265. Religious solidarity arises from a cluster of synchrony, self-control, and Big-God mechanisms — ch. 10
  266. Hindu Thaipusam devotees earn both divine credit and social prestige proportional to self-inflicted pain. — ch. 10
  267. Cost commitment, not religion per se, drives group survival advantage — ch. 10
  268. Extreme public self-costing rituals attract devoted mass followings — ch. 10
  269. Memorability alone cannot explain which supernatural agents get worshipped — ch. 10
  270. Costly religious displays signal hard-to-fake commitment to group beliefs, like romantic love signals fidelity. — ch. 10
  271. Strict religious sects cyclically erode into laxness and spawn stricter splinters — ch. 10
  272. Groups imposing costlier requirements attract more committed members — ch. 10
  273. Cognitive content alone cannot explain which supernatural agents become gods — ch. 10
  274. Publicly costly acts of devotion serve to convert nonbelievers, not just reassure fellow believers — ch. 10
  275. Witnessing a ritual boosts generosity as much as participating does — ch. 10
  276. Credible religious displays need not be costly to signal conviction — ch. 10
  277. Belief in any idea requires adult testimony and credible displays of devotion — ch. 10
  278. Religious practices assembled by cultural evolution, not genetic adaptations — ch. 10
  279. Belief-commitment differs fundamentally from mere mental representation of gods — ch. 10
  280. Psychology textbooks ignored religion entirely even into the 1990s — ch. 10
  281. Religious agents’ minimal counterintuitiveness makes them memorably transmissible — ch. 10
  282. Religious extravagance functions as naturally selected honest signaling of group commitment — ch. 10
  283. Belief in a deity and committed worship of that deity are psychologically distinct — ch. 10
  284. Costly signaling predicts universal religious displays while CRED allows cultural variability — ch. 10
  285. Cultural learning biases explain passionate commitment to some gods but not others — ch. 10
  286. Ideas survive by generating useful inferences, not by being true — ch. 10
  287. Commitment to one god does not require denying other gods’ existence — ch. 10
  288. Emotionally charged religious content gets remembered and retold more — ch. 10
  289. Costly requirements predict religious group longevity independent of other factors — ch. 10
  290. Big God belief plus costly displays boosted Islamic trade success in Africa — ch. 10
  291. Agricultural societies correlate with doctrinal rituals; small foraging groups use imagistic ones — ch. 11
  292. Gods’ moral involvement grows with group size culturally — ch. 11
  293. Forager deities are weak, ignorant, and indifferent to human morality — ch. 11
  294. Supernatural monitoring needs neither monotheism nor creator status — ch. 11
  295. Small groups cooperate easily but large groups fail without coordination — ch. 11
  296. Cross-cultural data show moralizing gods correlate with chronic water scarcity — ch. 11
  297. Morally concerned deities appear as societies scale up — ch. 11
  298. The religion-morality link emerged culturally and recently in history — ch. 11
  299. Hunter-gatherer groups lack the Big Gods of modern religions — ch. 11
  300. Religious congregation may have drawn hunter-gatherers into settled agriculture — ch. 11
  301. Foraging peoples’ deities lack power, knowledge, and moral concern — ch. 11
  302. Organized religion may have preceded agriculture rather than followed it — ch. 11
  303. Early Chinese Shang religion had a supreme watching deity over ancestor worship — ch. 11
  304. Group size is bounded by brainpower unless cultural solutions lift the limit — ch. 11
  305. Kin selection fails to stabilize cooperation even at village scale — ch. 11
  306. Big God prosocial religions contributed to, not merely resulted from, large-scale societies — ch. 11
  307. Cultural equilibria can lock in maladaptive paranoia and mutual suspicion — ch. 11
  308. Kin selection and reciprocity fail even in groups of 300 people — ch. 11
  309. A god’s deterrent effect scales with its perceived omniscience — ch. 11
  310. Preagricultural social complexity waxed and waned rather than progressing linearly — ch. 11
  311. Small transparent groups need no moralizing gods to sustain cooperation — ch. 11
  312. Agricultural societies favor doctrinal rituals and moralistic Big Gods — ch. 11
  313. Hunter-gatherers moved multi-ton stones before any sedentary technology existed — ch. 11
  314. Hunter-gatherer gods lacked wide moral concern and omniscience — ch. 11
  315. Early farming worsened health yet sustained larger populations than foraging did. — ch. 11
  316. As groups grow, moral enforcement and religion become intertwined. — ch. 11
  317. Religious congregation at sacred sites may have driven the adoption of farming — ch. 11
  318. China’s alleged lack of moralizing gods challenges the Big God thesis — ch. 11
  319. Secular substitutes can replace Big Gods without undermining the pattern — ch. 11
  320. Small-scale foraging societies lack omniscient moralizing gods, refuting gene-only accounts — ch. 11
  321. Big Gods prevalence should increase with group size — ch. 11
  322. Water scarcity contributed to the Khmer Empire’s collapse and favored desert moralizing gods — ch. 11
  323. Belief in divine moral punishment enabled the Zhou kingdom’s expansion — ch. 11
  324. Göbekli Tepe is an 11,500-year-old temple predating agriculture — ch. 11
  325. Cultural evolution can spread maladaptive behaviors that destroy social cooperation — ch. 11
  326. Whether supernatural monitoring drove China’s unification remains historically disputed — ch. 11
  327. Forager religion lacks moral teaching, clergy, and afterlife beliefs — ch. 11
  328. Moralizing gods and costly rituals coevolved to boost in-group cooperation and out-compete rivals. — ch. 11
  329. Limited-omniscience deities deter cheating only within their perceived range — ch. 11
  330. Supernatural watcher fears emerged to police reputation in a gossiping species — ch. 11
  331. As groups grow, religion acquires harder-to-fake markers that convert strangers into moral communities — ch. 11
  332. Large anonymous groups cannot sustain collective action without some enforcing mechanism — ch. 11
  333. Big Gods are absent among hunter-gatherer societies like the Hadza — ch. 11
  334. Researchers agree supernatural-punishment psychology drives religious cooperation — ch. 11
  335. Survival stress, not water scarcity per se, predicts moralizing deities — ch. 11
  336. Group size predicts Big Gods independent of stratification and missionary contact — ch. 11
  337. Supernatural watcher beliefs check selfish behavior once social worlds grew transparent — ch. 11
  338. Rituals divide into high-frequency doctrinal and rare emotionally intense imagistic modes. — ch. 11
  339. Larger social groups require proportionally more brain tissue to manage — ch. 11
  340. Modern hunter-gatherers are imperfect windows onto ancestral human life — ch. 11
  341. Cultural selection and genetic adaptation theories of supernatural punishment differ fundamentally — ch. 11
  342. Small transparent groups sustain cooperation without moralizing supernatural agents — ch. 11
  343. Moralizing gods are a minority across documented world cultures — ch. 11
  344. Supernatural monitoring evolves to solve cooperation problems in large anonymous groups — ch. 11
  345. Chinese kingship legitimation tied rule to divine moral surveillance — ch. 11
  346. Written records reveal religions evolving toward moralizing Big Gods with scale — ch. 11
  347. Moralizing gods were rare in ancestral foraging religions — ch. 11
  348. Chiefdom deities are intermediate between forager spirits and full Big Gods — ch. 11
  349. High fertility plus conversion, not doctrine, make world religions — ch. 12
  350. Religious fundamentalists may outcompete secular liberalism through reproduction — ch. 12
  351. Prosocial religions outcompeted rival groups historically and scaled up human social organization — ch. 12
  352. Cultural evolution favors religious groups that maximize reproduction — ch. 12
  353. Religious worship frequency linearly predicts higher fertility across 82 countries — ch. 12
  354. Prosocial religious practices may have genetically altered their adopting groups — ch. 12
  355. Religious fertility advantages are culturally transmitted, not genetically fixed — ch. 12
  356. Prosocial religions outcompeted rivals through group solidarity advantages in warfare — ch. 12
  357. Purely rational groups collapse more easily than ones bound by sacred values — ch. 12
  358. Costly male rites spread via cultural group selection when they improve fighting success — ch. 12
  359. Intergroup competition triggers male generosity but leaves female giving unchanged — ch. 12
  360. Moral intuitions bind strangers into sacred communities that outcompete rivals — ch. 12
  361. Hard-to-fake religious displays enabled trust and credit among converts — ch. 12
  362. Belief in a personal watchful God predicts condemnation of moral transgressions — ch. 12
  363. Warfare and resource competition drove the rise of large groups and Big Gods — ch. 12
  364. Prosocial religions helped groups scale up, especially in intense borderland conflict — ch. 12
  365. Societies scale up through added hierarchy levels, not mere population growth — ch. 12
  366. Sub-replacement fertility compounds geometrically toward population collapse. — ch. 12
  367. Religiously affiliated women outbreed the nonaffiliated in Switzerland — ch. 12
  368. Religious doctrines that boost fertility outcompete rival religious groups demographically. — ch. 12
  369. Group-level selection favors tribes whose members sacrifice for the common good — ch. 12
  370. Darwin himself held that tribal solidarity wins out as natural selection. — ch. 12
  371. Moral judgments serve group cohesion, not abstract individual reasoning — ch. 12
  372. Costly religious requirements statistically explain why religious communes outlasted secular ones fourfold — ch. 12
  373. Intergroup competition shifts populations toward self-sacrificial cooperation — ch. 12
  374. Warfare between groups predicts costly male rites, internal conflict and mating do not — ch. 12
  375. Religious competition, not innate piety, drives American religiosity — ch. 12
  376. Religious groups expand through higher fertility rates, not just persuasion — ch. 12
  377. Group cultural dominance depends on conversions and fertility, not just longevity — ch. 12
  378. Religious affiliation raises fertility even after controlling for education and income — ch. 12
  379. Moral systems are interlocking mechanisms that regulate self-interest to enable cooperation — ch. 12
  380. More religious societies have higher fertility than equally wealthy secular ones. — ch. 12
  381. No non-religious population has sustained above-replacement fertility for a century — ch. 12
  382. Secular society is the first major cultural rival to religiously organized cooperation — ch. 12
  383. Extending moral concern to anonymous strangers was originally a religious achievement. — ch. 12
  384. Perceived external threat strengthens in-group solidarity and norm enforcement across cultures — ch. 12
  385. Historical territorial conflict predicts strict cultural norm-enforcement centuries later — ch. 12
  386. Religious ritual makes otherwise secular values sacred and conflicts less tractable — ch. 13
  387. Religion must be decomposed into parts before asking which cause conflict — ch. 13
  388. Mortality reminders amplify intolerance unless paired with compassionate in-group teachings — ch. 13
  389. Religious altruism turns violent only under perceived group threat in asymmetric conflict — ch. 13
  390. Religious violence shifts historically within traditions, so no religion is inherently violent — ch. 13
  391. Dogmatism and exclusivism travel with religion but are not religion — ch. 13
  392. Religion drives conflict through three fluid pathways that also allow it to reduce conflict — ch. 13
  393. Religious priming produces generosity biased toward ingroup members — ch. 13
  394. Religious attendance predicts martyrdom support across six major religions worldwide — ch. 13
  395. Prayer frequency and belief exclusivity are separable dimensions of religiosity — ch. 13
  396. Religious tolerance and violence change within a tradition across centuries — ch. 13
  397. Strong social ties also enable exclusion and violence toward outsiders — ch. 13
  398. Hajj participation increases tolerance toward out-group members via cross-group contact — ch. 13
  399. Frequent prayer reduces scapegoating once dogmatic exclusivity is controlled — ch. 13
  400. The attendance-violence link generalizes across six major religions internationally — ch. 13
  401. Religion’s harms stem from corporate and dogmatic dominion, not religion itself — ch. 13
  402. The religious-belief explanation for intergroup violence remains scientifically untested. — ch. 13
  403. Belief content may not cause intergroup violence; solidarity may instead. — ch. 13
  404. Sacred values resist trade-offs and override rational self-interest in decision making. — ch. 13
  405. Religion’s signature vices stem from institutional power and doctrinal rigidity, not belief itself — ch. 13
  406. Suicide attacks tripled between 2000 and 2003 and spread in waves of imitation. — ch. 13
  407. Feeling closer to ingroup members increases dehumanization of outgroups — ch. 13
  408. Sacred values are inviolable in conviction yet flexible in application — ch. 13
  409. Sacralization transforms mundane disputes into prolonged, nonnegotiable existential conflicts. — ch. 13
  410. Hajj participation increases tolerance toward Muslims and non-Muslims alike. — ch. 13
  411. Sacred values are inviolable in conviction yet flexible in application due to interpretive ambiguity — ch. 13
  412. Secular ideologies carried out most twentieth-century genocides — ch. 13
  413. Sacred values resist material trade-offs and respond to symbolic meaning — ch. 13
  414. Religion’s role in conflict varies by contextual conditions to identify — ch. 13
  415. The question is which religious part causes conflict, not whether religion does — ch. 13
  416. The same religious bundle contains both conflict and peace resources — ch. 13
  417. Contact with diverse pilgrims drives the hajj’s tolerance effect. — ch. 13
  418. Scientific knowledge about religion’s role in conflict is strikingly thin — ch. 13
  419. Religious devotion’s link to scapegoating depends on disentangling companion traits — ch. 13
  420. Big God religions create social boundaries excluding outsiders through supernatural monitoring. — ch. 13
  421. Priming communal attendance raises approval of violence while priming prayer lowers it — ch. 13
  422. Religion factors into most wars but rarely causes them — ch. 13
  423. Religious attendance, not private prayer, predicts support for suicide attacks — ch. 13
  424. The rational actor paradigm fails to explain intercultural conflict — ch. 13
  425. Ignoring sacred values in negotiation actively worsens conflicts — ch. 13
  426. Material incentives backfire on sacred values while symbolic recognition softens opposition. — ch. 13
  427. Religion bundles opposing tendencies that both fuel and curb prejudice — ch. 13
  428. Religion drives conflict through monitoring, bonding, and sacralized values that block compromise. — ch. 13
  429. Self-interested rational-actor models cannot explain devotion-driven human behavior. — ch. 13
  430. Death reminders inflame xenophobia unless compassionate religious values are primed — ch. 13
  431. Religion declines most steeply in strong welfare states — ch. 14
  432. Religions succeed by offering greater comfort against existential threats — ch. 14
  433. God functions as an attachment figure who soothes and threatens simultaneously — ch. 14
  434. Priming intuitive thinking temporarily raises belief in God. — ch. 14
  435. Outside WEIRD societies only religious ties extend cooperation beyond kin groups — ch. 14
  436. Folk theism is System 1 intuition while deliberate atheism is System 2 — ch. 14
  437. Priming analytic thought reduces expressed belief in God — ch. 14
  438. Autistic believers describe God without personal relationship or emotional dependency. — ch. 14
  439. Religiosity declines as existential security and economic equality rise — ch. 14
  440. Autistic deficits in mentalizing predict higher rates of religious disbelief. — ch. 14
  441. Atheism has multiple independent causal pathways, not one — ch. 14
  442. Inducing a merely analytic thinking style lowers stated belief in God. — ch. 14
  443. Religious faith is sustained by multiple independent psychological flames — ch. 14
  444. Rational proofs of God fail because belief acceptance is not reasoned — ch. 14
  445. Religious thought defaults while disbelief requires deliberate cognitive effort — ch. 14
  446. Exposure to natural disasters increases religiosity even controlling for income and education — ch. 14
  447. Gods and governments occupy the same functional niche in human psychology — ch. 14
  448. Tacit supernatural beliefs arise naturally in children across all cultures. — ch. 14
  449. Life stability and security make religious belief fade through indifference — ch. 14
  450. Cognitive scientists hold that theism is intuitive and atheism unnatural — ch. 14
  451. Cognitive disfluency reduces religious belief across all conviction levels — ch. 14
  452. Existential anxiety increases religious conviction while appeased anxiety weakens it — ch. 14
  453. Religious belief spreads through witnessed displays that can also reverse into doubt. — ch. 14
  454. Temple Grandin conceives of God as universal entangled consciousness. — ch. 14
  455. Religious belief depends on mentalizing skills that imagine God’s mental states. — ch. 14
  456. Religious disbelief is linked to a stable analytic cognitive style. — ch. 14
  457. Three independent labs converged that religious belief tracks intuitive thinking. — ch. 14
  458. Reminders of randomness and loneliness amplify belief in God — ch. 14
  459. Randomness, loneliness, and bereavement each causally amplify religious belief — ch. 14
  460. Societal existential security and equality predict reduced religiosity — ch. 14
  461. Surveillance replaces religion only when the watcher is believed impartial. — ch. 14
  462. Modern states repurposed the all-seeing eye motif rather than abandoning it — ch. 14
  463. Strong secular institutions can substitute for watchful gods in enforcing morality. — ch. 14
  464. Religious belief spreads culturally only when sincerity is publicly displayed, not merely claimed. — ch. 14
  465. God concepts must first pass a cognitive hurdle before they can acquire anxiety-soothing functions — ch. 14
  466. Belief in gods depends on an intuitive mind-body dualism — ch. 14
  467. Priming police and judge boosts generosity as much as God words do. — ch. 14
  468. Strong welfare states with stable institutions erode religious belief — ch. 14
  469. Monotheism inadvertently planted the seeds of science and atheism — ch. 14
  470. Monotheism’s disenchantment of nature enabled scientific exploration and atheism — ch. 14
  471. Implicit theism arises from rapid automatic intuitions rather than reasoned belief — ch. 14
  472. Secular government functions as a continuation of religious authority by other means — ch. 14
  473. Deliberative System 2 thinking introduces doubt and can override religious intuitions — ch. 14
  474. Existential security, government stability, and subdued public religiosity mutually reinforce widespread disbelief — ch. 14
  475. Post-Soviet religious resurgence tracked whether democracy or corruption replaced communism. — ch. 14
  476. People embrace even the frightening parts of religion during existential threats — ch. 14
  477. Lower average mentalizing in men explains part of the gender gap in religiosity — ch. 14
  478. Directly experiencing disaster increases religious faith despite secularization trends — ch. 14
  479. Mentalizing deficits are only one contributing factor to religious disbelief. — ch. 14
  480. Religion both causes anxiety and relieves it through punishment and comfort — ch. 14
  481. Denmark maintained high social trust while rapidly losing religious belief — ch. 14
  482. Science and atheism require many simultaneous conditions to flourish, unlike religion — ch. 14
  483. Science and atheism are both counterintuitive and hard to learn. — ch. 14
  484. Strong state institutions and existential security replace religion’s functions — ch. 14
  485. Mind-body dualism is an intuitive building block of all religious thinking. — ch. 14
  486. Secular societies reached large-scale cooperation through religion then discarded it — ch. 14
  487. Religious belief cannot be understood apart from secular authority structures — ch. 14
  488. Reminders of death temporarily spike belief in any available gods — ch. 14
  489. Atheism lacks the intuitive support that religious belief enjoys. — ch. 14
  490. Religious groups offset secularization losses through higher birth rates — ch. 14
  491. Existential security and welfare states mutually reinforce religious decline in Scandinavia. — ch. 14
  492. Intuitive thinkers should be more religious and analytic thinkers more doubtful — ch. 14
  493. Lower mentalizing ability erodes belief in a personal God. — ch. 14
  494. Perceived government instability increases belief in God as compensation — ch. 14
  495. Everyone is an intuitive theist even when self-reflectively atheist. — ch. 14
  496. Challenge to faith via theodicy is a luxury most believers cannot afford — ch. 14
  497. Autistic religiosity lacks an interpersonal relationship with a communicating God — ch. 14
  498. Science, literacy, and atheism each need multiple simultaneous conditions to survive — ch. 14
  499. Secular institutions substitute for Big Gods by enforcing stranger cooperation — ch. 14
  500. Belief and disbelief arise through the same four cognitive pathways. — ch. 14
  501. Atheism can become a stable cultural equilibrium comparable to universal literacy — ch. 14
  502. Analytic thinking primes people to overrule quick intuition-based answers. — ch. 14
  503. Universities undermine religious belief by inculcating analytic thinking — ch. 14
  504. Atheism can become culturally stable despite religion’s cognitive head start. — ch. 14
  505. Universal monotheism introduced individual free choice and collective humanity as new concepts — ch. 14
  506. Threatened personal control increases faith in God or government interchangeably — ch. 14
  507. Religious disbelief correlates with analytic thinking independent of education, intelligence, or demographics — ch. 14
  508. Human minds carry epistemic-vigilance biases against being duped — ch. 15
  509. Religion is an evolving family-resemblance package, not a natural kind — ch. 15
  510. Some cultures punish cooperators rather than freeriders in economic games — ch. 15
  511. Mohist moralizers deployed belief in watchful punishing ghosts — ch. 15
  512. Buddhism as lived practice is full of supernatural agents despite nontheistic theology — ch. 15
  513. Religious people exaggerate their attendance and charity in self-reports. — ch. 15
  514. Buddhism is lived as a supernatural religion despite nontheistic theology — ch. 15
  515. Residual theistic intuitions persist even among explicit nonbelievers — ch. 15
  516. Involuntary bodily expressions function as hard-to-fake religious commitment signals — ch. 15
  517. Traditions that prioritize practice over belief show less prejudice against atheists — ch. 15
  518. Religiosity has only a small, reliable correlation with racial prejudice — ch. 15
  519. Rituals tied to supernatural agents are judged more effective, boosting their potency — ch. 15
  520. Foraging societies’ gods rarely enforce moral rules that humans themselves uphold — ch. 15
  521. Belief in hell predicts economic productivity independent of general religiosity — ch. 15
  522. Motivational reasoning biases perception without requiring conscious wishful thinking — ch. 15
  523. Religious priming boosts prosocial behavior only for believers, not non-believers. — ch. 15
  524. The United States stays religious because of inequality and weak safety nets — ch. 15
  525. Practice-heavy religious traditions dampen supernatural-monitoring concerns and atheist prejudice — ch. 15
  526. The most culturally resilient practices are not the most moral ones — ch. 15
  527. In some non-Western societies cooperators rather than freeriders get punished — ch. 15
  528. Supernatural monitoring and compassion independently drive prosocial behavior. — ch. 15
  529. Human ultrasociality began with Natufian villages scaling up 12,000 years ago — ch. 15
  530. Kinship and reciprocity alone cannot explain large-scale human cooperation — ch. 15
  531. Anthropomorphism is conditional and triggered, not automatic and promiscuous — ch. 15

Annotation Roundup

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