Believing in God is inseparable from anthropomorphizing God as a personlike mind

Evidence

People “see human” in all kinds of things and beings, from natural formations, to artifacts, to pets and gods. Anthropologist Stewart Guthrie gives many examples of this in his book Faces in the Clouds. Gods are no exception. Closely tied to Barret and Keil’s original findings are studies showing that, despite scriptural prohibitions, God is believed to possess humanlike mental attributes such as beliefs, emotions, and intentions. Psychologists Adam Waytz, Nicholas Epley, and John Cacioppo tested everyday intuitions about the extent to which various entities had mental states, such as consciousness, awareness, and emotional experiences. They asked participants about four commonly anthropomorphized entities: nonhuman animals, natural entities such as rocks and mountains, technological devices such as computers and car engines, and God and other supernatural agents. Peoples’ tendency to attribute humanlike minds to God was so tied up with their belief in God that it made no sense to separate anthropomorphizing God from believing in God. My own studies independently confirm this finding: the intuition that God is a personlike being with mental states and believing in God are highly related. An abstract, impersonal God is theologically possible, but psychologically not compelling. — Norenzayan, Ara, Big gods - how religion transformed…, 77

Anthropologist Stewart Guthrie gives many examples of this in his book Faces in the Clouds. Gods are no exception. Closely tied to Barret and Keil’s original findings are studies showing that, despite scriptural prohibitions, God is believed to possess humanlike mental attributes such as beliefs, emotions, and intentions. Psychologists Adam Waytz, Nicholas Epley, and John Cacioppo tested everyday intuitions about the extent to which various entities had mental states, such as consciousness, awareness, and emotional experiences. They asked participants about four commonly anthropomorphized entities: nonhuman animals, natural entities such as rocks and mountains, technological devices such as computers and car engines, and God and other supernatural agents. Peoples’ tendency to attribute humanlike minds to God was so tied up with their belief in God that it made no sense to separate anthropomorphizing God from believing in God. My own studies independently confirm this finding: the intuition that God is a personlike being with mental states and believing in God are highly related. An abstract, impersonal God is theologically possible, but psychologically not compelling. — Norenzayan, Ara, Big gods - how religion transformed…, 77

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines the psychological claim that ‘personlike God with mental states’ and ‘belief in God’ are inseparable, with the key closing aphoristic point.
• XREF: Connects to the reader’s Big God mechanism — the Big God only works as a moral enforcer if perceived as a personlike mind watching; an abstract impersonal God would not trigger partner-choice or reputation mechanisms. — connects to: Religious belief is a by-product of cognitive predispositions, not an evolved adaptation — Norenzayan, Ara, Big gods - how religion transformed…, 357; Belief in a god is separable from commitment to it, except in monotheism.; Autism-linked mentalizing deficits reduce belief in a personal God (+7 more)
• corroborated: 3 independent passages support this claim — Norenzayan, Ara, Big gods - how religion transformed…, 77