Autistic deficits in mentalizing predict higher rates of religious disbelief.

Evidence

Of all these symptoms, perhaps the most critical aspect of the autism spectrum that causes social difficulties is selective deficits in reasoning about the mental states of others. The higher someone is on the autism spectrum, the more difficulty he or she has in inferring the mental states of others from their actions, telling the difference between what someone says versus means, and understanding emotions. This leads to the surprising idea, hypothesized by virtually all leading cognitive scientists of religion, of an association between autism and religious disbelief. Having difficulties representing mental states, autistic individuals are less likely to conceptualize God or other deities as personlike agents with mental states. Without personalizing God, it is hard for them to get the significance of these beings in their own lives. It becomes harder, although not impossible, to be a believer. — Norenzayan, Ara, Big gods - how religion transformed…, 585

Categorization

• QUESTION: This grounds the Big God mechanism in individual cognitive architecture — the reader might probe whether the fumi-e test targets the social-recognition channel precisely because personal relationship with God is the vulnerable node.
• XREF: Connects to the reader’s Big God framework: an omniscient, mental-state-holding deity only disciplines behavior if believers can mentalize him as an agent who watches.
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Norenzayan, Ara, Big gods - how religion transformed…, 585