Ideas survive by generating useful inferences, not by being true

Evidence

A second reason why concepts travel better is that they help brains do what brains are designed to do: understand and predict life’s events. (Pascal Boyer calls this a concept’s “inferential potential.”22) Take for example, the idea that misfortune, such as getting struck by a debilitating illness, is random—it can happen to anyone, anytime, without logic or purpose. This is not a very memorable or popular idea, because it doesn’t lead to useful or helpful inferences or actions. Even if true, knowing this fact wouldn’t change what we do. In contrast, the folk notion that illnesses are caused by the curse or jealousy of others, or by the wrath of God, is a powerful piece of information that compels further thinking and action. It tells us to be careful about other people who might not have our best interests in their hearts, or to hide our successes from them, or to obey God’s will without question, and so on. Ideas that compel action tend to be contagious. — Norenzayan, Ara, Big gods - how religion transformed…, 360

Categorization

• XREF: This is the mechanism Norenzayan’s whole Big God argument rests on — connects directly to Baumard’s partner-choice account and to how Rodrigues’ faith persists in Silence despite empirical disconfirmation, because it still compels action. — connects to: A model’s false assumptions can still yield correct predictions through a different mechanism. — Donald MacKenzie, An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial…, 244; Financial models survive despite known false predictions when they remain useful. — Donald MacKenzie, An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial…, 60
• DEFINE: Defines ‘inferential potential’ — Boyer’s term for an idea’s power to trigger useful predictions and actions, which is the crux of why supernatural beliefs survive.