Belief-commitment differs fundamentally from mere mental representation of gods

Evidence

Put another way, we must explain one of the most critical features of religions, that of faith or passionate commitment to supernatural agents. There is a profound psychological difference between supernatural beliefs that are mentally represented but treated as fictional (fairies in folktales, the gods of other religions) and those that are mentally represented and worshipped (the gods of one’s own group). Cultural learning biases can explain why some counterintuitive representations galvanize profound commitment, while others are treated merely as entertaining curiosities, despite their transmission advantage. The distinction between mental representation and belief-commitment is crucial to explain cultural differences in the degree of religious commitment around the world, the existence of disbelief, and how certain gods, like Zeus—despite having similar cognitive content throughout the ages—can move from a worshipped deity to the fictional character of myths and stories. — Norenzayan, Ara, Big gods - how religion transformed…, 367

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines the crucial representation-vs-commitment distinction that anchors the reader’s own analysis: gods can be mentally represented yet not believed in, which is exactly what the fumi-e trampling ritual exploits.
• XREF: The Zeus example — a worshipped god demoted to fiction — maps onto the reader’s analytical contrast between Rodrigues’ deepening commitment and the Japanese authorities’ instrumental treatment of belief.