Ideas that violate folk intuitions spread only with heavy institutional support
Evidence
The variety of intuitions that a person might have about how the world works is the third factor that determines how successfully ideas transmit. Beliefs rely heavily on reliably developing intuitions, including intuitions people have about inert physical objects, plants and animals, and intentional beings with consciousness. For example, modern quantum physics tells us that the same particle can exist in two locations simultaneously, which radically violates intuitive expectations from folk notions of physical causality; neuroscience tells us that mental experiences arise from brain activity, which radically violates folk notions of mind-body dualism. These notions donāt go far in the cultural marketplace unless they are supported by a heavy dose of instruction and institutional support. Alternatively, according to Dan Sperber, these types of ideas spread only as placeholders. Much like obscure religious ideas like the Holy Trinity or reincarnation, they become popular shells but their content remains opaque and open to interpretation. ā Norenzayan, Ara, Big gods - how religion transformedā¦, 361
Categorization
- XREF: The āplaceholdersā idea (Sperber) resonates with how Rodriguesā high-theology notions of God would stay opaque shells for Japanese peasants versus the experiential, intuitive force of the fumi-e. ā connects to: Renouncing thought under institutional pressure becomes an incapacity for it ā Theodor W. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections fromā¦, 151; Ideas spread when they articulate a publicās preexisting unease, not by their novelty. ā Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone The Collapse and Revivalā¦, 2640; Ideas spread only across terrain prepared by prior slow imitation ā Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason, 117 (+1 more)