Religious homogeneity increases cooperative behavior among strangers

Evidence

In one early study, a team of economists led by John Orbell examined cooperative behavior in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game toward strangers in two American cities with vastly different levels of religious diversity. They found that individuals in a religiously homogenous Mormon society (Logan, Utah), where one could be confident that the stranger shared one’s religious beliefs, were far more willing to engage in cooperative behavior toward each other than those in a religiously heterogenous society (Eugene, Oregon). Furthermore, while greater levels of religious attendance was associated with more cooperative behavior in the homogenous Logan sample, no such correlation was observed in Eugene. This lends some support to the idea that religious markers elicit prosociality, and shows the bounded nature of religious trust. — Norenzayan, Ara, Big gods - how religion transformed…, 215

Categorization

• XREF: Connects directly to partner choice theory (Baumard et al.) — shared religious markers make an anonymous other a viable cooperative partner. This is the empirical grounding for why the fumi-e (forcing public apostasy) destroys the partner-choice signal. — connects to: Prosocial religious groups outcompeted rivals through internal cooperation.; Large-scale cooperation and religion’s endurance explain each other; Religious participation, not belief, drives support for intergroup conflict (+6 more)
• SEED: An article comparing how religious markers signaled trustworthiness historically (Logan’s Mormon homogeneity) with how public apostasy rituals (fumi-e) dismantled that signaling infrastructure.
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Norenzayan, Ara, Big gods - how religion transformed…, 215

Broader Connections

• Religious situations boost prosociality more than personal devotion does #corroborates (0.85) — Norenzayan, Ara, Big gods - how religion transformed…, 154
• Anticipated future interaction makes people substantially more cooperative #qualifies (0.72) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 554