Reciprocal trust creates mutual incentives for trustworthiness

Evidence

In this experiment, the standard trust game and the mutual help trust game exhibit two very different patterns. In the standard game, the more you give, the greater are your rights to the money and the greater the amount of money you receive. In the mutual help game, the more you give to the other participant, the greater the amount of money she keeps. This contrast makes clear sense in a mutualistic morality of fairness and impartiality. Every gift creates an obligation. The character of the obligation, however, varies according to the kind of partnership involved. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 166

Categorization

• DEFINE: Experimental operationalization of two distinct obligation types — reciprocal exchange versus mutualistic help — via contrasting trust-game variants.
• ADDENDUM: As with osotua, this mutualist vs. reciprocator distinction aids the fumi-e argument by showing gifts carry context-dependent obligations that the forced apostasy ritual destroys.
• corroborated: 3 independent passages support this claim — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 166
• XREF: connects to: Trust requires time for repeated interactions and is a cognitive capacity; Trust matters precisely because relations have prisoner’s-dilemma structure — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 908; Reciprocal trust multiplies each party’s incentive to be trustworthy — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 1016 (+40 more)

Related

• Forced interdependence can generate trust almost instantly (similarity 0.92)
• Reciprocity motivations can be self-reinforcing where further interactions are plentiful (similarity 0.92)
• Future gains from continued interaction function as both incentive and sanction for trust. (similarity 0.91)
• Trustworthiness carries the moral burden because short-run incentives favor betrayal (similarity 0.90)
• Trust requires time for repeated interactions and is a cognitive capacity (similarity 0.88)
• Mature relationships make trust overdetermined by multiple independent motives (similarity 0.88)
• Relationships that must escalate invite trust disruptions that mimic endgame effects (similarity 0.87)
• Building stable relations generates the incentives that produce trust (similarity 0.86)
• Reciprocal trust multiplies each party’s incentive to be trustworthy (similarity 0.86)
• Reciprocated cooperation teaches one to internalize others’ interests (similarity 0.86)
• Repeated interaction transforms the incentives of a one-way trust game (similarity 0.85)
• State unreliability cascades into mutual distrust that blocks cooperation (similarity 0.85)
• Trust is encapsulated interest achievable through many incentive mechanisms (similarity 0.85)
• Cost-driven market ties evolve into trust-laden partnerships over time (similarity 0.84)
• Trust relationships self-maintain once the parties recognize mutual benefit (similarity 0.84)

Broader Connections

• Reciprocal trust multiplies each party’s incentive to be trustworthy #corroborates (0.95) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 1016
• Mutual trust in iterated exchange is selffulfilling through aligned incentives #expands (0.88)
• Extending trust can create the trustworthy behavior it presumes #expands (0.88)
• Repeated interaction transforms the incentives of a one-way trust game #corroborates (0.85)
• Building stable relations generates the incentives that produce trust #corroborates (0.82)
• Trust requires both freedom to defect and constraints that make cooperation attractive #expands (0.78)
• Trust is encapsulated interest achievable through many incentive mechanisms #expands (0.75)