Relationships that must escalate invite trust disruptions that mimic endgame effects

Evidence

In this experiment, the standard trust game and the mutual help trust game exhibit two very different patterns. In the standard game, the more you give, the greater are your rights to the money and the greater the amount of money you receive. In the mutual help game, the more you give to the other participant, the greater the amount of money she keeps. This contrast makes clear sense in a mutualistic morality of fairness and impartiality. Every gift creates an obligation. The character of the obligation, however, varies according to the kind of partnership involved. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 166 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Trustworthiness collapses once a relationship’s end becomes foreseeable; Sudden escalation of stakes can transform iterated trust into one-shot opportunism; Mature relationships make trust overdetermined by multiple independent motives (+6 more)

Related

• Mature relationships make trust overdetermined by multiple independent motives (similarity 0.90)
• Trustworthiness carries the moral burden because short-run incentives favor betrayal (similarity 0.87)
• Forced interdependence can generate trust almost instantly (similarity 0.87)
• Reciprocal trust creates mutual incentives for trustworthiness (similarity 0.87)
• Future gains from continued interaction function as both incentive and sanction for trust. (similarity 0.86)
• Trust requires time for repeated interactions and is a cognitive capacity (similarity 0.83)
• Reciprocity motivations can be self-reinforcing where further interactions are plentiful (similarity 0.82)
• State unreliability cascades into mutual distrust that blocks cooperation (similarity 0.82)
• Trust emerges from gradually escalated reciprocal exchanges in ongoing relationships (similarity 0.82)
• Trusting action increases one’s vulnerability to another whose behavior is uncontrolled (similarity 0.82)
• Cost-driven market ties evolve into trust-laden partnerships over time (similarity 0.82)
• Trust can be extended to create an obligation in the trusted (similarity 0.81)
• Repeated interaction transforms the incentives of a one-way trust game (similarity 0.81)
• Trust collapses when escalating stakes make an ongoing interaction feel one-shot. (similarity 0.81)
• Cooperative relationships require asymmetric giving at their outset (similarity 0.81)

Broader Connections

• Reciprocal trust creates mutual incentives for trustworthiness #corroborates (0.80) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 166
• Trusting action increases one’s vulnerability to another whose behavior is uncontrolled #corroborates (0.80)
• Extending trust can create the trustworthy behavior it presumes #complicates (0.80)
• Mature relationships make trust overdetermined by multiple independent motives #corroborates (0.75)
• Supererogatory acts convert the conditions for trust’s emergence into maintenance #complicates (0.75)