Trustworthiness carries the moral burden because short-run incentives favor betrayal
Evidence
In this experiment, the standard trust game and the mutual help trust game exhibit two very different patterns. In the standard game, the more you give, the greater are your rights to the money and the greater the amount of money you receive. In the mutual help game, the more you give to the other participant, the greater the amount of money she keeps. This contrast makes clear sense in a mutualistic morality of fairness and impartiality. Every gift creates an obligation. The character of the obligation, however, varies according to the kind of partnership involved. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 166 (
#qualifies, via linked claim)
Categorization
- XREF: connects to: Moral dispositions resist contrary incentives yet people overestimate their behavioral role — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 216; Reciprocal trust creates mutual incentives for trustworthiness — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 166; Moralized accounts of trust actually moralize trustworthiness (+2 more)
Related
- Reciprocal trust creates mutual incentives for trustworthiness (similarity 0.90)
- Mature relationships make trust overdetermined by multiple independent motives (similarity 0.90)
- Forced interdependence can generate trust almost instantly (similarity 0.89)
- Relationships that must escalate invite trust disruptions that mimic endgame effects (similarity 0.87)
- Trust requires time for repeated interactions and is a cognitive capacity (similarity 0.86)
- Future gains from continued interaction function as both incentive and sanction for trust. (similarity 0.86)
- Reciprocity motivations can be self-reinforcing where further interactions are plentiful (similarity 0.84)
- State unreliability cascades into mutual distrust that blocks cooperation (similarity 0.82)
- Trust is encapsulated interest achievable through many incentive mechanisms (similarity 0.82)
- Trustworthiness needs no moral groundings to sustain trust (similarity 0.81)
- Building stable relations generates the incentives that produce trust (similarity 0.81)
- Trustworthiness begets trust via reputation and repeated dealings (similarity 0.81)
- Reciprocal trust multiplies each party’s incentive to be trustworthy (similarity 0.81)
- Cost-driven market ties evolve into trust-laden partnerships over time (similarity 0.81)
- Trust relationships self-maintain once the parties recognize mutual benefit (similarity 0.80)
Broader Connections
- Moralized accounts of trust actually moralize trustworthiness
#expands(0.85) - Reciprocal trust creates mutual incentives for trustworthiness
#qualifies(0.75) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 166