Trust requires time for repeated interactions and is a cognitive capacity

Evidence

Trust is often achieved simply by the continuity of the relation between parties and the recognition by each that what he might gain by cheating in a given instance is outweighed by the value of the tradition of trust that makes possible a long sequence of future agreement. By the same token, “trust” may be achieved for a single discontinuous instance, if it can be divided into a succession of increments. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 311 (#expands, via linked claim)

In this experiment, the standard trust game and the mutual help trust game exhibit two very different patterns. In the standard game, the more you give, the greater are your rights to the money and the greater the amount of money you receive. In the mutual help game, the more you give to the other participant, the greater the amount of money she keeps. This contrast makes clear sense in a mutualistic morality of fairness and impartiality. Every gift creates an obligation. The character of the obligation, however, varies according to the kind of partnership involved. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 166 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Repeated-interaction gains let trust outweigh distrust despite occasional great losses — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 311; Moral trust requires temporally stable social contexts to operate; Future gains from continued interaction function as both incentive and sanction for trust. (+10 more)

Related

• Repeated interaction transforms the incentives of a one-way trust game (similarity 0.91)
• Reciprocity motivations can be self-reinforcing where further interactions are plentiful (similarity 0.90)
• Repeated-interaction gains let trust outweigh distrust despite occasional great losses (similarity 0.90)
• Future gains from continued interaction function as both incentive and sanction for trust. (similarity 0.88)
• Reciprocal trust creates mutual incentives for trustworthiness (similarity 0.88)
• Cost-driven market ties evolve into trust-laden partnerships over time (similarity 0.87)
• Forced interdependence can generate trust almost instantly (similarity 0.87)
• Trustworthiness begets trust via reputation and repeated dealings (similarity 0.87)
• Trustworthiness carries the moral burden because short-run incentives favor betrayal (similarity 0.86)
• Infinite repetition sustains honest exchange without any binding commitment (similarity 0.85)
• Trust is encapsulated interest achievable through many incentive mechanisms (similarity 0.84)
• Optimism about others’ trustworthiness is self-reinforcing through gained experience (similarity 0.84)
• Mature relationships make trust overdetermined by multiple independent motives (similarity 0.84)
• Trust relationships self-maintain once the parties recognize mutual benefit (similarity 0.84)
• Trust requires time enough for repeated interactions on which to ground it. (similarity 0.83)

Broader Connections

• Repeated-interaction gains let trust outweigh distrust despite occasional great losses #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 311
• Future gains from continued interaction function as both incentive and sanction for trust. #expands (0.80)
• Trustworthiness begets trust via reputation and repeated dealings #expands (0.80) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 793
• Repeated interaction transforms the incentives of a one-way trust game #expands (0.80)
• Reciprocal trust creates mutual incentives for trustworthiness #expands (0.80) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 166
• Moral trust requires temporally stable social contexts to operate #qualifies (0.75)
• Trusting always exceeds available evidence; reasons for trust are retrospective self-justification #complicates (0.75)