Common knowledge of mutual confidence makes a focal point self-sustaining

Evidence

And, if the Nash point appeals to us powerfully in the bargaining game, it must do so because we are confident that it appeals equally to our partner who in turn we believe to be aware that our views coincide. It must therefore appeal to us in the pure coordination game as a unique point that the partner will consider to be obviously obvious. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 667

Categorization

  • XREF: Common-knowledge-of-common-knowledge — the reader’s Schellingian credible-commitment reading of hostage mechanics in the Mafia. — connects to: Optimism about others’ trustworthiness is self-reinforcing through gained experience; Trust relationships self-maintain once the parties recognize mutual benefit; Reciprocal trust creates mutual incentives for trustworthiness — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 166 (+2 more)

Broader Connections