Informal moral behavior builds reputation through accumulated small signals, defeating free-riding.

Evidence

When it is practiced informally, mutualistic cooperation so understood does not allow proper bookkeeping and might therefore seem much more open to free-riding than strict reciprocity. With partner choice, however, the reverse may well be the case. Informal mutualistic cooperative actions differ greatly in the degree to which they are individually compensated by specific cooperative actions of others, but nearly all contribute to some degree to the individual’s moral reputation. A mutualistic social life is dense with information relevant to everyone’s reputation. This information is not confined to cases of full defection (e.g., refusal to cooperate) but is present in all intermediate cases between full defection and perfect equity. Each time one holds the door a bit too briefly or hesitates to give a ride, one signals one’s reluctance to meet the demands of mutually advantageous cooperation. More generally, the more varied the forms of informal mutual interaction, the richer the evidence which can sustain or, on the contrary, compromise one’s reputation. Hence, being uncooperative in a mutualistic community may be quite costly; “freeriding” may turn out anything but free. In such conditions, it is prudent – a prudence which, we suggest, is built into our evolved moral disposition – to behave routinely in a moral way rather than check each and every time whether one could, without reputational costs, profit by behaving immorally (Frank 1988; Gauthier 1986; Trivers 1971). — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 80

Categorization

• XREF: Connects directly to the reader’s stated reading purpose: this is the mechanism underpinning Big God moral enforcement, and the reputational cost logic the fumi-e was designed to exploit. Also echoes Trivers’ reciprocal altruism. — connects to: Moral gossip targets more than fairness, tracking loyalty and norm adherence too. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 436; Competitive signalling may drive moral conduct beyond mere fairness. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 526; Moralistic punishment of defectors is itself a costly reputational signal. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 532 (+10 more)
• ADDENDUM: Supports ‘On Sacrifice: The Real Kind, with Corpses’ — public moral reputation structure is what ritual apostasy (fumi-e) weaponizes against a cooperative community.

Related

• Cooperative behavior is partly motivated by reputation concerns. (similarity 0.86)
• A genuine moral sense evolved to secure reputation as a cooperator (similarity 0.84)
• Moral gossip targets more than fairness, tracking loyalty and norm adherence too. (similarity 0.84)
• Moralistic punishment of defectors is itself a costly reputational signal. (similarity 0.79)
• Competitive signalling may drive moral conduct beyond mere fairness. (similarity 0.79)
• Competition for partners drives costly reputation-building cooperation. (similarity 0.79)
• Reputational self-interest alone cannot explain why people act morally when unobserved. (similarity 0.79)
• Trustworthiness begets trust via reputation and repeated dealings (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Cooperative behavior is partly motivated by reputation concerns. #corroborates (0.92) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 311
• Trustworthiness arises from many small open stages rather than single sovereign strokes #expands (0.88)
• Trustworthiness begets trust via reputation and repeated dealings #corroborates (0.85) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 793
• Building stable relations generates the incentives that produce trust #corroborates (0.85)
• Reciprocal trust creates mutual incentives for trustworthiness #corroborates (0.82) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 166
• Reputation-building is a deliberate investment of foregone gains #qualifies (0.78)
• Reputation means changing beliefs, not merely incentive-compatible behavior #complicates (0.75)
• Reputation is a public inference of disposition from background and behavior #expands (0.74)
• Moral trust requires temporally stable social contexts to operate #qualifies (0.72)