Repeated interaction transforms the incentives of a one-way trust game

Evidence

Trust is often achieved simply by the continuity of the relation between parties and the recognition by each that what he might gain by cheating in a given instance is outweighed by the value of the tradition of trust that makes possible a long sequence of future agreement. By the same token, “trust” may be achieved for a single discontinuous instance, if it can be divided into a succession of increments. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 311 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Trust requires time for repeated interactions and is a cognitive capacity; Reciprocal trust creates mutual incentives for trustworthiness — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 166; Repeated-interaction gains let trust outweigh distrust despite occasional great losses — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 311 (+12 more)

Related

• Repeated-interaction gains let trust outweigh distrust despite occasional great losses (similarity 0.94)
• Infinite repetition sustains honest exchange without any binding commitment (similarity 0.92)
• Cost-driven market ties evolve into trust-laden partnerships over time (similarity 0.92)
• Trust requires time for repeated interactions and is a cognitive capacity (similarity 0.91)
• Reciprocity motivations can be self-reinforcing where further interactions are plentiful (similarity 0.91)
• Future gains from continued interaction function as both incentive and sanction for trust. (similarity 0.88)
• Trust is encapsulated interest achievable through many incentive mechanisms (similarity 0.87)
• Trustworthiness begets trust via reputation and repeated dealings (similarity 0.86)
• Building stable relations generates the incentives that produce trust (similarity 0.86)
• Reciprocal trust creates mutual incentives for trustworthiness (similarity 0.85)
• Trustworthiness persists only while future gains from the relationship outweigh defection (similarity 0.85)
• Optimism about others’ trustworthiness is self-reinforcing through gained experience (similarity 0.85)
• Trust relationships self-maintain once the parties recognize mutual benefit (similarity 0.84)
• Forced interdependence can generate trust almost instantly (similarity 0.83)
• Reciprocal trust multiplies each party’s incentive to be trustworthy (similarity 0.83)

Broader Connections

• Future gains from continued interaction function as both incentive and sanction for trust. #expands (0.92)
• Repeated-interaction gains let trust outweigh distrust despite occasional great losses #expands (0.90) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 311
• Building stable relations generates the incentives that produce trust #expands (0.90)
• Repeated future encounters make trust breach structurally costly #expands (0.90)
• Mutual trust in iterated exchange is selffulfilling through aligned incentives #expands (0.88)
• Sudden escalation of stakes can transform iterated trust into one-shot opportunism #qualifies (0.80)
• Mere incentive compatibility is insufficient for trust as encapsulated interest #qualifies (0.75)