Cooperative behavior is partly motivated by reputation concerns.

Evidence

But how does the vast literature on image scoring and indirect reciprocity fit with this view? Humans are more cooperative if they can gain social prestige (Milinski et al. 2002; Wedekind & Milinski 2000) and may even respond cooperatively to the presence of eyes (Bateson et al. 2006; Haley & Fessler 2005; but see Fehr & Schneider 2010). These findings suggest that human cooperative behaviour is at least partly motivated by strategic concerns about reputation, rather than based solely on a genuine moral sense. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 311

Categorization

• XREF: Directly bears on the reader’s Big-God mechanism frame: even a moral sense of intrinsic cooperativeness is intertwined with reputational signaling — relevant to whether apostasy via fumi-e actually works. — connects to: Moral behavior shifts with the market supply and demand of cooperative partners — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 394; Moral gossip targets more than fairness, tracking loyalty and norm adherence too. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 436; Competition for partners drives costly reputation-building cooperation. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 531 (+18 more)
• QUESTION: The ‘eyes’ effect (Bateson) and its failed replication (Fehr & Schneider) is worth chasing — it bears on how strictly visible moral surveillance drives behavior.

Related

• Informal moral behavior builds reputation through accumulated small signals, defeating free-riding. (similarity 0.86)
• Competition for partners drives costly reputation-building cooperation. (similarity 0.85)
• Cooperation collapses once the threat of reputation-based punishment is removed. (similarity 0.84)
• A genuine moral sense evolved to secure reputation as a cooperator (similarity 0.83)
• Reputation alone can sustain cooperation where direct reciprocity is impossible. (similarity 0.83)
• Moral gossip targets more than fairness, tracking loyalty and norm adherence too. (similarity 0.82)
• Trustworthiness begets trust via reputation and repeated dealings (similarity 0.80)
• Reputation earned in one social game sustains cooperation in separate social dilemmas. (similarity 0.80)
• Cooperation and morality are distinct categories. (similarity 0.80)
• Reputational self-interest alone cannot explain why people act morally when unobserved. (similarity 0.79)
• A trustworthy reputation can be exploited because it is imperfectly known (similarity 0.79)
• Cooperative relationships require asymmetric giving at their outset (similarity 0.79)
• Cooperation requires knowing others’ motives and being believed trustworthy (similarity 0.78)
• Moral behavior shifts with the market supply and demand of cooperative partners (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Trustworthiness begets trust via reputation and repeated dealings #corroborates (0.95) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 793
• Reputation can inform decisions about personal associations. #expands (0.90) — Jordan B. Peterson, 12 Rules for Life An Antidote to Chaos, 325
• Reputation-building is a deliberate investment of foregone gains #expands (0.85)
• Reciprocal trust creates mutual incentives for trustworthiness #expands (0.80) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 166
• Reputation means changing beliefs, not merely incentive-compatible behavior #complicates (0.80)
• Small groups succeed at collective action because dyadic trust motivates cooperation #contradicts (0.75)
• Cooperation can operate independently of trust #contradicts (0.75)
• Cooperation can occur without trust when incentives align #contradicts (0.75)
• Communal trustworthiness can seed willingness to trust in wider society #expands (0.75) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 823
• Actual trustworthiness combines motives that resist institutional mimicry #complicates (0.75)
• Pervasive distrust is stable because solo cooperation invites exploitation #corroborates (0.70)