Reciprocity motivations can be self-reinforcing where further interactions are plentiful

Evidence

Trust is often achieved simply by the continuity of the relation between parties and the recognition by each that what he might gain by cheating in a given instance is outweighed by the value of the tradition of trust that makes possible a long sequence of future agreement. By the same token, “trust” may be achieved for a single discontinuous instance, if it can be divided into a succession of increments. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 311 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

In this experiment, the standard trust game and the mutual help trust game exhibit two very different patterns. In the standard game, the more you give, the greater are your rights to the money and the greater the amount of money you receive. In the mutual help game, the more you give to the other participant, the greater the amount of money she keeps. This contrast makes clear sense in a mutualistic morality of fairness and impartiality. Every gift creates an obligation. The character of the obligation, however, varies according to the kind of partnership involved. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 166 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Reciprocated cooperation teaches one to internalize others’ interests; Small communities enforce generalized reciprocity rather than one-on-one exchange — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 821; Individual motives become social only through forms of mutual interaction — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 194 (+20 more)

Related

• Reciprocal trust creates mutual incentives for trustworthiness (similarity 0.92)
• Repeated interaction transforms the incentives of a one-way trust game (similarity 0.91)
• Reciprocated cooperation teaches one to internalize others’ interests (similarity 0.91)
• Trust requires time for repeated interactions and is a cognitive capacity (similarity 0.90)
• Future gains from continued interaction function as both incentive and sanction for trust. (similarity 0.90)
• Forced interdependence can generate trust almost instantly (similarity 0.89)
• Cost-driven market ties evolve into trust-laden partnerships over time (similarity 0.88)
• Repeated-interaction gains let trust outweigh distrust despite occasional great losses (similarity 0.87)
• Trust is encapsulated interest achievable through many incentive mechanisms (similarity 0.87)
• Infinite repetition sustains honest exchange without any binding commitment (similarity 0.86)
• Generalized reciprocity emerges from frequent diverse interaction and boosts efficiency (similarity 0.86)
• Reciprocal trust multiplies each party’s incentive to be trustworthy (similarity 0.85)
• State unreliability cascades into mutual distrust that blocks cooperation (similarity 0.85)
• Trust relationships self-maintain once the parties recognize mutual benefit (similarity 0.85)
• Trustworthiness begets trust via reputation and repeated dealings (similarity 0.85)

Broader Connections

• Future gains from continued interaction function as both incentive and sanction for trust. #corroborates (0.90)
• Reciprocal trust creates mutual incentives for trustworthiness #corroborates (0.85) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 166
• Repeated-interaction gains let trust outweigh distrust despite occasional great losses #corroborates (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 311
• Mutual trust in iterated exchange is selffulfilling through aligned incentives #corroborates (0.85)
• Individual motives become social only through forms of mutual interaction #expands (0.80) — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 194
• Repeated interaction transforms the incentives of a one-way trust game #expands (0.80)
• Trust is anchored in a grasp of the other’s interests, not just behavior prediction #expands (0.75)