Voluntary acts of personal trust give the trusted party an incentive to be trustworthy

Evidence

Acts of personal trust can serve in certain contexts—particularly in contexts where the trustee is not entirely constrained by independent sanctions—to express either the message that the trustee is possessed of suitable virtue, or the message that if the trustee does not let down the trustor then they will be taken to have proved themselves suitably virtuous. Those acts, as we may say, can express a belief in the virtue of the trustee or a presumption on that virtue. But in either case it is clear that if the trustee is going to enjoy the good opinion of the trustor—or of others who are witnesses to the act of trust—then they had better not let the trustor down. And that means that as a trustor contemplates an overture of trust in one of the relevant contexts, in relative ignorance of whether the trustee is actually possessed of virtue or not, they can reassure themselves that the very act of trust is bound to be supportive of compliance by the trustee. The act of trust means that the trustee has something to win by proving reliable, something to lose by proving unreliable; it recruits the intangible hand in its own support. — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 1203

Categorization

• STORYSTEM: The ‘cunning of trust’ — a protagonist who inoculates a potentially treacherous ally by visibly trusting them, coercing virtue through reputation stakes — is a readymade dramatic mechanism for a betrayal-or-loyalty arc.
• XREF: connects to: Mutual trust predates and is prerequisite for civic virtue. — Adelin-Costin Dumitru, Forging the Resistive Republic: Social…, 33; Reciprocal trust multiplies each party’s incentive to be trustworthy — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 1016; Trust is rational expectation about the trusted party’s self-interest — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 78 (+7 more)

Broader Connections

• Reciprocal trust creates mutual incentives for trustworthiness #expands (0.92) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 166
• Reciprocal trust multiplies each party’s incentive to be trustworthy #expands (0.90) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 1016
• Institutional and legal constraints give people strong external incentives to be trustworthy #qualifies (0.88)
• Trust is rational expectation about the trusted party’s self-interest #complicates (0.85) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 78
• Social conventions and organizational incentives can make people trustworthy #qualifies (0.82) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 235
• Ongoing relations make the trusted party’s own interests compel fulfilling trust #expands (0.80) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 112
• Trust relationships self-maintain once the parties recognize mutual benefit #expands (0.80)
• Trust requires knowing the other’s incentives to honor it #expands (0.78) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 530
• Trust is encapsulated interest achievable through many incentive mechanisms #expands (0.75)