Building stable relations generates the incentives that produce trust

Evidence

Coleman (1990, 177–80) implicitly includes the trusted’s incentives when he notes that a reciprocal trusting relationship, as in mutual trust in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, is mutually reinforcing for each truster. Why? Because each person now has additional incentive to be trustworthy. I trust you because it is in your interest to do what I trust you to do so long as you want me to do what you trust me to do. If there is some residue beyond rational expectations in one-way trust, there is less role for that residue in this straight, likely self-interested, exchange. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 1016 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Trust matters precisely because relations have prisoner’s-dilemma structure — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 908; Reciprocal trust creates mutual incentives for trustworthiness — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 166; Repeated interaction transforms the incentives of a one-way trust game (+12 more)

Related

• Trust relationships self-maintain once the parties recognize mutual benefit (similarity 0.94)
• Reciprocal trust multiplies each party’s incentive to be trustworthy (similarity 0.91)
• Trust is encapsulated interest achievable through many incentive mechanisms (similarity 0.90)
• Cost-driven market ties evolve into trust-laden partnerships over time (similarity 0.88)
• Forced interdependence can generate trust almost instantly (similarity 0.87)
• Reciprocal trust creates mutual incentives for trustworthiness (similarity 0.86)
• Repeated interaction transforms the incentives of a one-way trust game (similarity 0.86)
• Trust rests on the trusted party’s self-interest, not on their personal character (similarity 0.85)
• Trust requires both freedom to defect and constraints that make cooperation attractive (similarity 0.85)
• Reciprocity motivations can be self-reinforcing where further interactions are plentiful (similarity 0.85)
• Trust matters precisely because relations have prisoner’s-dilemma structure (similarity 0.85)
• Future gains from continued interaction function as both incentive and sanction for trust. (similarity 0.84)
• Trustworthiness begets trust via reputation and repeated dealings (similarity 0.84)
• Trust can be extended to create an obligation in the trusted (similarity 0.84)
• Rational trust requires both trusted’s incentives and truster’s knowledge (similarity 0.84)

Broader Connections

• Mutual trust in iterated exchange is selffulfilling through aligned incentives #expands (0.90)
• Reciprocal trust multiplies each party’s incentive to be trustworthy #expands (0.85) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 1016
• Cooperation can occur without trust when incentives align #qualifies (0.85)
• Extending trust can create the trustworthy behavior it presumes #expands (0.80)
• Trust requires both freedom to defect and constraints that make cooperation attractive #expands (0.75)