Cooperative relationships require asymmetric giving at their outset

Evidence

Second, the actions we take to form, strengthen, or repair mutualistic relationships differ by relationship stage (Clark & Beck 2011). To win people over to a cooperative communal relationship, for instance, we begin by offering more benefits than we request, but, if a commitment to a relationship is made, offers and requests even out if needs are even (Beck & Clark 2009). — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 341

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Cooperation is symmetric while dependence is asymmetric.; Trust emerges from gradually escalated reciprocal exchanges in ongoing relationships — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 15; Initial cooperation can wreck backward induction and build rational trust — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 606 (+6 more)

Related

• Forced interdependence can generate trust almost instantly (similarity 0.87)
• Reciprocal trust creates mutual incentives for trustworthiness (similarity 0.83)
• Competitive altruism permits unconditional giving rather than matched reciprocity (similarity 0.82)
• Trust requires both freedom to defect and constraints that make cooperation attractive (similarity 0.82)
• State unreliability cascades into mutual distrust that blocks cooperation (similarity 0.81)
• Altruistic cooperators still choose partners they trust and cooperate only where reciprocation is possible. (similarity 0.81)
• Trust and cooperation form a reciprocal, asymmetric loop rather than a one-directional act (similarity 0.81)
• Reciprocity motivations can be self-reinforcing where further interactions are plentiful (similarity 0.81)
• Explaining trust requires understanding the conditions of cooperation (similarity 0.81)
• Reciprocated cooperation teaches one to internalize others’ interests (similarity 0.81)
• Cooperation rests on coercion, interests, values, and personal bonds (similarity 0.81)
• Rational backward induction alone can void all mutually beneficial exchange. (similarity 0.81)
• Relationships that must escalate invite trust disruptions that mimic endgame effects (similarity 0.81)
• Cooperative ventures are exchanges proportional to each partner’s contribution. (similarity 0.81)
• Cooperation can evolve without any trust being involved. (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Initial cooperation can wreck backward induction and build rational trust #corroborates (0.85) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 606
• Mutual trust cannot develop in unequal, nonreciprocal power relations #qualifies (0.85) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 477
• Trust emerges from gradually escalated reciprocal exchanges in ongoing relationships #corroborates (0.80) — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 15
• Trust is a result rather than a precondition of cooperation #corroborates (0.80) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2781
• Relationships that must escalate invite trust disruptions that mimic endgame effects #expands (0.80)
• Competition for partners drives costly reputation-building cooperation. #contradicts (0.80) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 531
• Cooperation is symmetric while dependence is asymmetric. #complicates (0.75)