State unreliability cascades into mutual distrust that blocks cooperation

Evidence

In this experiment, the standard trust game and the mutual help trust game exhibit two very different patterns. In the standard game, the more you give, the greater are your rights to the money and the greater the amount of money you receive. In the mutual help game, the more you give to the other participant, the greater the amount of money she keeps. This contrast makes clear sense in a mutualistic morality of fairness and impartiality. Every gift creates an obligation. The character of the obligation, however, varies according to the kind of partnership involved. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 166 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Mafia enforcement makes distrust rational and blights mutual-benefit competition; Cooperation can occur without trust when incentives align; Pervasive distrust is stable because solo cooperation invites exploitation (+17 more)

Related

• Forced interdependence can generate trust almost instantly (similarity 0.86)
• Reciprocity motivations can be self-reinforcing where further interactions are plentiful (similarity 0.85)
• Reciprocal trust creates mutual incentives for trustworthiness (similarity 0.85)
• Trust requires time for repeated interactions and is a cognitive capacity (similarity 0.82)
• Trustworthiness carries the moral burden because short-run incentives favor betrayal (similarity 0.82)
• Relationships that must escalate invite trust disruptions that mimic endgame effects (similarity 0.82)
• Trust requires both freedom to defect and constraints that make cooperation attractive (similarity 0.82)
• Cooperative equilibria require conditional trust, not blind trust or blind distrust (similarity 0.81)
• Cooperative relationships require asymmetric giving at their outset (similarity 0.81)
• Cooperation can occur without trust when incentives align (similarity 0.81)
• Mafia enforcement makes distrust rational and blights mutual-benefit competition (similarity 0.81)
• Cooperation is broader than trust and mostly grounded in institutions, not trust. (similarity 0.81)
• Future gains from continued interaction function as both incentive and sanction for trust. (similarity 0.81)
• Cheating tempts traders while cooperation yields shared gains. (similarity 0.81)
• Cost-driven market ties evolve into trust-laden partnerships over time (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Reciprocal trust creates mutual incentives for trustworthiness #corroborates (0.85) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 166
• Mutual trust in iterated exchange is selffulfilling through aligned incentives #corroborates (0.82)
• Trust and distrust can be institutionally interlocked without undermining each other #qualifies (0.80)
• Repeated-interaction gains let trust outweigh distrust despite occasional great losses #complicates (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 311
• Cooperation unravels without iterated mutual knowledge of cooperative intentions. #corroborates (0.80)
• Distrust functions as an equivalent alternative to trust #contradicts (0.78) — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 262
• Trust and distrust can increase together within differentiated systems. #qualifies (0.78) — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 313
• Cooperation can operate independently of trust #contradicts (0.75)
• Distrust strategies can become autonomous habitual routines #expands (0.75)