A credible threat can subordinate the final decision to chance outside the threatener’s control

Evidence

The key to these threats is that, though one may or may not carry them out if the threatened party fails to comply, the final decision is not altogether under the threateneds control. The threat is not quite of the form “I may or may not, according as I choose,” but, has an element of, “I may or may not, and even I can’t be altogether sure.” … Where does the uncertain element in the decision come from? It must come from somewhere outside of the threatener’s control. Whether we call it “chance,” accident, third-party influence, imperfection in the machinery of decision, or just processes that we do not entirely understand, it is an ingredient in the situation that neither we nor the party we threaten can entirely control. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 416

Categorization

• DEFINE: The definitional core of the chapter: what makes a threat credible is removing the power of decision from the threatener, delegating it to chance or third parties.
• XREF: Parallels Schelling’s own hostage/commitment logic; connects to the reader’s hostage-mechanics and credible-commitments framing in the stated reading purpose. — connects to: Threatening a small risk beats threatening certainty when the enemy’s controllability is uncertain. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 427; A threat must be credible and credible threats require commitment — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 23; A probabilistic threat stays credible despite failures because one trial proves little — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 422 (+8 more)

Related

• A threat to act is only credible if one is committed, not merely willing (similarity 0.87)
• Small-probability threats are superior to large certain threats in compellence (similarity 0.87)
• A credible threat works precisely because it need never be carried out. (similarity 0.86)
• Threatening a small risk beats threatening certainty when the enemy’s controllability is uncertain. (similarity 0.86)
• A credible conditional commitment must combine both a promise and a threat. (similarity 0.85)
• A deterrent threat is only credible if control over its triggering is partly surrendered. (similarity 0.84)
• Protection demands are credible only when they come from established sources. (similarity 0.83)
• A threat must be credible and credible threats require commitment (similarity 0.83)
• A threat only coerces when the threatener has visibly left himself no choice (similarity 0.82)
• Credible threats must attach penalties to observable acts, not intentions (similarity 0.82)
• Deterrent threats can be passive but compellent threats require commitment (similarity 0.80)
• Credible commitment requires finding a penalty against one’s own nonperformance (similarity 0.80)
• A threat binds only if the other believes it cannot be retracted (similarity 0.80)
• Threats only matter when players can irreversibly change the game (similarity 0.79)
• Credible threats can require revealing information that defeats the threat (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Threatening a small risk beats threatening certainty when the enemy’s controllability is uncertain. #complicates (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 427
• A threat must be credible and credible threats require commitment #qualifies (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 23