Small-probability threats are superior to large certain threats in compellence

Evidence

Given the fact that, even if the enemy complies, there is some risk that the box detonates war before he has a chance to collect himself and do our bidding, there is an advantage in making it less than certain that the box will explode on any given day. In ordinary deterrence—where nothing happens unless the enemy acts contrary to our demand—to threaten too much may be superfluous but not self-defeating; in the present case—where the threat starts fulfilling itself at a specified rate over time as soon as we commit ourselves to it—too big a threat can defeat its purpose. In this situation the small-probability threat is not just a possible substitute for the large certain threat; it is a superior and necessary alternative. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 442

Categorization

• XREF: Counterintuitive point that connects to the reader’s private-enforcement framing: the credible commitment must be scaled so the other party can comply in time, echoing hostage mechanics where the hostage must remain alive long enough for the demand to be met. — connects to: Threatening a small risk beats threatening certainty when the enemy’s controllability is uncertain. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 427; Compellence works by creating shared uncontrollable risk of catastrophe — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 444; A credible threat can subordinate the final decision to chance outside the threatener’s control — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 416 (+2 more)

Related

• Threatening a small risk beats threatening certainty when the enemy’s controllability is uncertain. (similarity 0.90)
• A credible threat can subordinate the final decision to chance outside the threatener’s control (similarity 0.87)
• A credible threat works precisely because it need never be carried out. (similarity 0.83)
• Threats require commitment, not comparative damage to both parties (similarity 0.81)
• A deterrent threat is only too large when its size damages credibility (similarity 0.81)
• Protection demands are credible only when they come from established sources. (similarity 0.80)
• A deterrent threat is only credible if control over its triggering is partly surrendered. (similarity 0.80)
• A credible conditional commitment must combine both a promise and a threat. (similarity 0.79)
• Fear of surprise attack produces all-or-none outcomes, not probability multiplication. (similarity 0.79)
• Deterrent threats can be passive but compellent threats require commitment (similarity 0.79)
• A threat must be credible and credible threats require commitment (similarity 0.79)
• Unforeseeable escalation risk alone can deter aggression even among cautious rational actors. (similarity 0.79)
• Credible threats must attach penalties to observable acts, not intentions (similarity 0.78)
• A threat only coerces when the threatener has visibly left himself no choice (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Compellence works by creating shared uncontrollable risk of catastrophe #expands (0.90) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 444
• A credible threat can subordinate the final decision to chance outside the threatener’s control #corroborates (0.90) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 416
• Unpredictable harm damages organisms more than predictable but greater harm #exemplifies (0.85)
• A deterrent threat is only too large when its size damages credibility #contradicts (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 711