A probabilistic threat stays credible despite failures because one trial proves little

Evidence

Finally, the threat is not discredited even if the Russians accomplish their purpose without triggering war. If the Russians estimate that the chance of inadvertent war during a particular month rises from very small to not-so-small if they create a crisis, and they go ahead anyway, and no major war occurs, they still have little reason to suppose that their original estimate was wrong, and little reason to suppose that repetition would be less risky, any more than a person who survives a single play of Russian roulette should decide it isn’t dangerous after all. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 422

Categorization

  • XREF: The Russian-roulette analogy parallels the Mafia context: a Don whose retaliation sometimes fails to materialize nonetheless remains credible because each episode is a fresh draw, not evidence against the probability. — connects to: A credible threat can subordinate the final decision to chance outside the threatener’s control — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 416; Threatening a small risk beats threatening certainty when the enemy’s controllability is uncertain. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 427; Decisive battles only validate already probable outcomes — Garrett Mattingly, The Defeat of the Spanish Armada, 899 (+2 more)
  • SHARE: Worth sending to anyone who argues ‘we tried deterrence and it didn’t escalate, so it’s safe’ — the single-play fallacy in probabilistic deterrence.

Broader Connections