A losing side rationally abandons containment for deliberate risk-creation.
Evidence
The supreme objective may not be to assure that it stays limited, but rather to keep the risk of all-out war within moderate limits above zero. At least this may be the strategy for the side that is in danger of “losing” a limited war. The less likely it is that the enemy’s aggressive advances can be contained by limited and local resistance, the more reason there may be to fall back upon the deliberate creation of mutual risk. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 431
Categorization
- DEEPTHINKING: Inverts the commonsense goal of conflict management: the rational move for a losing participant is to make the shared situation less safe, weaponizing mutual jeopardy precisely because it is mutual.
- XREF: connects to: Brinkmanship is placing oneself on an uncontrolled slope of shared risk — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 448; A credible threat can subordinate the final decision to chance outside the threatener’s control — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 416; Threats fail against irrational adversaries and trapped opponents — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 23 (+2 more)
Related
- Brinkmanship is placing oneself on an uncontrolled slope of shared risk (similarity 0.83)
- Unforeseeable escalation risk alone can deter aggression even among cautious rational actors. (similarity 0.83)
- Limited war deters partly by exposing both sides to uncontrollable risk of escalation (similarity 0.82)
- Threatening a small risk beats threatening certainty when the enemy’s controllability is uncertain. (similarity 0.80)
- Limited war’s main function is signaling escalation risk, not local military gain. (similarity 0.80)
- Fear of surprise attack feeds back into raising each side’s own probability of attacking (similarity 0.79)
- Even a player sure of his own restraint inherits the other’s amplified fears (similarity 0.78)
- Compellence works by creating shared uncontrollable risk of catastrophe (similarity 0.78)
Broader Connections
- Brinkmanship is placing oneself on an uncontrolled slope of shared risk
#expands(0.90) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 448 - A credible threat can subordinate the final decision to chance outside the threatener’s control
#expands(0.90) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 416 - Compellence works by creating shared uncontrollable risk of catastrophe
#expands(0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 444 - Threats fail against irrational adversaries and trapped opponents
#qualifies(0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 23 - Deliberate action requires partial but not total foresight of consequences
#qualifies(0.80) — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 785